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Biometric ID Cybersurveillance 
MARGARET HU* 
The implementation of a universal digitalized biometric ID system risks 
normalizing and integrating mass cybersurveillance into the daily lives of ordinary 
citizens. ID documents such as driver’s licenses in some states and all U.S. 
passports are now implanted with radio frequency identification (RFID) 
technology. In recent proposals, Congress has considered implementing a 
digitalized biometric identification card—such as a biometric-based, “high-tech” 
Social Security Card—which may eventually lead to the development of a universal 
multimodal biometric database (e.g., the collection of the digital photos, 
fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA of all citizens and noncitizens). Such “high-
tech” IDs, once merged with GPS-RFID tracking technology, would facilitate 
exponentially a convergence of cybersurveillance-body tracking and data 
surveillance, or dataveillance-biographical tracking. Yet, the existing Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence is tethered to a “reasonable expectation of privacy” test 
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that does not appear to restrain the comprehensive, suspicionless amassing of 
databases that concern the biometric data, movements, activities, and other 
personally identifiable information of individuals. 
In this Article, I initiate a project to explore the constitutional and other legal 
consequences of big data cybersurveillance generally and mass biometric 
dataveillance in particular. This Article focuses on how biometric data is 
increasingly incorporated into identity management systems through 
bureaucratized cybersurveillance or the normalization of cybersurveillance 
through the daily course of business and integrated forms of governance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, policymakers questioned 
whether identity management1 tools and systems were based upon outdated 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offers this definition of identity 
management: 
Identity Management (IdM) is a broad administrative area that deals with 
identifying and managing individuals within a government, state, local, public, 
or private sector network or enterprise. In addition, authentication and 
authorization to access resources such as facilities or, sensitive data within that 
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technologies that would fail to keep us secure.2 Biometric data3 technologies and 
systems have been proposed as a solution.4 Biometric-based identity management 
systems are now being recommended to augment or supersede existing identity 
verification tools which include passports, driver’s licenses, and Social Security 
Cards. Because biometric data is a unique signifier, it is perceived to be the most 
                                                                                                                 
system are managed by associating user rights, entitlements, and privileges with 
the established identity. 
Identity Management and Data Privacy Technologies Project, CYBER SEC. RESEARCH & 
DEV. CTR., http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/idmdp/. For an overview of identity management as 
a policy concept, see Lucy L. Thomson, Critical Issues in Identity Management—Challenges 
for Homeland Security, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 335 (2007). 
 2. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, emphasized the need to incorporate 
biometric data into identity management tools and systems in order to augment border 
security and national security objectives. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE 
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 385–92 (2004), available at http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (“Linking biometric passports to good data systems 
and decisionmaking is a fundamental goal.”). 
 3. Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of 
individuals using physiological or behavioral characteristics.” JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC 
TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007). Numerous scholars and experts have 
explored the science and application of biometrics and the consequences of this emerging 
technology. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and 
Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 
(2012); JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN 
U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND (2012); A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & JONATHAN 
WEINBERG, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, HARD TO BELIEVE: 
THE HIGH COST OF A BIOMETRIC IDENTITY CARD (2012), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Believe_Report_Final.pdf; KELLY A. GATES, OUR 
BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF 
SURVEILLANCE (2011); ANIL K. JAIN, ARUN A. ROSS, KARTHIK NANDAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION 
TO BIOMETRICS (2011); SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, 
RACE, AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY (2011); BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES (Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millett eds., 2010) [hereinafter BIOMETRIC 
RECOGNITION]; DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 118–36 (2007); 
VACCA, supra; ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 157–89 (2005); Robin Feldman, 
Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653 (2003); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY (2002) [hereinafter GAO 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157313.pdf; 
SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–
67 (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 3, at 1–2 (“The suggestion that an automated facial 
recognition system may have helped avert the September 11 terrorist attacks was perhaps the 
most ambitious claim circulating about biometric identification technologies in the aftermath 
of the catastrophe.”); JAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at vii (“[T]he deployment of biometric 
systems has been gaining momentum over the last two decades in both public and private 
sectors. These developments have been fueled in part by recent [post-9/11] government 
mandates stipulating the use of biometrics for ensuring reliable delivery of various 
services.”). 
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reliable and fraud-resistant form of identification data.5 Some examples of 
biometric data include digital photos, fingerprint and iris scans, and DNA.6 This 
Article explores how these post-9/11 concerns have placed an emphasis on 
expanding the biometric ID cybersurveillance capacities of the government. I 
examine how these cybersurveillance capacities are expanding through 
technological advances, the increasing bureaucratization of surveillance, and the 
broadening scope of identity management systems. Specifically, I contend that 
emerging biometric cybersurveillance technologies, and mass biometric data 
collection and database screening, are adding an entirely new and unprecedented 
dimension to day-to-day bureaucratized surveillance.7 
To place the identity management phenomenon within its historical context, it is 
useful to note that identity cards8 and other forms of identity registration9 have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See infra Part III.C (describing some of the challenges of biometrics as a solution to 
identity management system vulnerabilities); Bruce Schneier, Biometrics, SCHNEIER ON SEC. 
BLOG (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/01/biometrics.html 
(“[B]iometrics are easy to steal. . . . Biometrics are unique identifiers, but they’re not 
secrets.”). 
 6. In the criminal justice context, in particular, scholars are increasingly examining the 
consequences of the collection of biometric data, new forensic techniques, and biometric 
technologies, including the surveillance capacities of these new techniques and technologies. 
See, e.g., David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other 
Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095 (2013); Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: 
Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
665 (2011); Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the 
Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721 (2007). Other scholars 
specifically focus their scholarship on a growing predominance of behavioral genetics and 
the use of neuroscience evidence in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, 
Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012) [hereinafter Farahany, Incriminating 
Thoughts]; Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239 (2012) [hereinafter 
Farahany, Searching Secrets]. 
 7. Multiple scholars have researched the intersection of biometric identification 
technologies and post-9/11 government surveillance. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321 
(2012); David Lyon, Biometrics, Identification and Surveillance, 22 BIOETHICS 499 (2008); 
Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2008); GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE 
AND POLICING: BORDERS, SECURITY, IDENTITY (Elia Zureik & Mark B. Salter eds., 2005); 
Elia Zureik & Karen Hindle, Governance, Security and Technology: The Case of Biometrics, 
73 STUD. POL. ECON. 113 (2004). 
 8. For a discussion of what documents comprise identity cards and the surveillance 
consequences of identity documents, see generally DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID 
CARDS AS SURVEILLANCE (2009); PLAYING THE IDENTITY CARD: SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY 
AND IDENTIFICATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Colin J. Bennett & David Lyon eds., 2008). 
For an overview of the legal and policy implications of recently adopted and recently 
proposed digitalized identification systems, including privacy issues, see, for example, JIM 
HARPER, IDENTITY CRISIS: HOW IDENTIFICATION IS OVERUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD (2006); 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 45–54, 68–70 (2006); PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES 
OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela 
Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and Personhood in 
National Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319 (2002). 
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enabled bureaucratized surveillance10 for more than 200 years.11 Bureaucratized 
surveillance is unlike traditional notions of foreign intelligence-type spying for the 
purposes of strategic defense. Bureaucratized surveillance integrates the mass 
tracking of ordinary citizens into forms of governance that are normalized and 
routine.12 This routinized surveillance is implemented by administrative agencies, 
or their private sector delegates13 and security or surveillance assemblages,14 during 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATE 
PRACTICES IN THE MODERN WORLD (Jane Caplan & John Torpey eds., 2001) (discussing the 
historical genesis of identity documentation and the transnational nature of identity 
registration protocols across nation states); JOHN TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: 
SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP AND THE STATE (2000) (arguing that modern governments have 
monopolized the legitimacy of human movement, as well as the conferral and denial of 
rights and penalties, through the construction of identification systems such as the passport). 
For additional historical perspectives on identity registration and national identification 
systems, and proposals for a digitalized ID system in the United States, see generally 
NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: ESSAYS IN OPPOSITION (Carl Watner & Wendy McElroy 
eds., 2004); JOSEPH W. EATON, CARD-CARRYING AMERICANS: PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND THE 
NATIONAL ID CARD DEBATE (1986). 
 10. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 3, at 5 (asserting that “scholars maintain that, while late 
capitalist societies may not precisely mirror Orwell’s vision, computerization is nevertheless 
enabling significant advancements in institutionalized forms of surveillance”); LYON, supra 
note 3, at 74–75 (contending that new forms of surveillance are “‘file-based’ or bureaucratic 
surveillance” and elaborating that “modern surveillance methods are rationalized using 
accounting methods and file-based coordination” (emphasis in original)); see also DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004) 
(describing the manner in which modern privacy violations occur as a result of corporate and 
bureaucratic action). 
 11. See CRAIG ROBERTSON, THE PASSPORT IN AMERICA: THE HISTORY OF A DOCUMENT 
26 (2010) (“By 1782 the passport, although not a required document, was sufficiently 
recognized that the Continental Congress gave the recently created Department of Foreign 
Affairs [renamed the Department of State] the responsibility to issue passports in the name 
of the United States.”). 
 12. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 3, at 13 (describing how a “system of standardized 
documents, archives, and administrative procedures for the management of individual 
identities itself displaced the more personal and informal forms of trust and recognition 
characteristic of smaller-scale forms of social organization. The aim of a documentary 
regime of verification was to assign each individual an official identity that could be verified 
in repeated transactions with the state and other institutions.”); Jane Caplan, ‘This or That 
Particular Person’: Protocols of Identification in Nineteenth-Century Europe, in 
DOCUMENTING INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY, supra note 9, at 49, 51; LYON, supra note 3, at 80–84. 
 13. Several scholars have examined the manner in which immigration screening (e.g., 
inspection of identity and immigration documents or immigration database screening—
forms of bureaucratized surveillance and bureaucratized cybersurveillance, respectively) is 
increasingly privatized or delegated by the federal and state governments to private entities 
(e.g., employers, landlords, doctors, and transportation companies). See, e.g., Margaret Hu, 
Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535 (2012); Stephen Lee, Private 
Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Huyen Pham, The 
Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777 (2008). This delegation 
parallels a movement to delegate and outsource domestic and foreign intelligence gathering 
activities to the private sector as well. See, e.g., DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP 
SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 176–201 (2011). 
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the daily course of business. Thus, technological advances recently incorporated 
into the development of typical identity registration methods—such as driver’s 
licenses, passports, and Social Security Cards and Social Security Numbers—are in 
the process of transforming bureaucratized surveillance by adding a 
“cybersurveillance”15 component and data surveillance, or “dataveillance,”16 
component. The term “biometric ID cybersurveillance”17 describes how recently 
introduced forms of identity registration and identity processing—such as 
digitalized ID cards and “cardless” ID systems such as biometric ID databases or 
smartphones—facilitate a convergence of cybersurveillance-body tracking and 
dataveillance-biographical tracking. 
In other words, contemporary cybersurveillance technologies are merging with 
bureaucratized surveillance to create “bureaucratized cybersurveillance.”18 This 
                                                                                                                 
 14. LYON, supra note 3, at 4 (“Using personal data, techniques derived from military, 
administrative, employment, policing and consumer practices combine[d] to create a 
complex matrix of power; a surveillance assemblage.”); see also Kevin D. Haggerty & 
Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605 (2000). 
 15. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 209 (describing cybersurveillance or “digital surveillance” 
as “the process by which some form of human activity is analyzed by a computer according 
to some specified rule. . . . [T]he critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a 
computer is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human.”). 
 16. Roger Clarke is attributed with first introducing the term “dataveillance” into 
academic discourse. See Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 
COMM. ACM 498 (1988). Clarke describes dataveillance as the systematic monitoring or 
investigation of people’s actions, activities, or communications through the application of 
information technology. Id.; see also LYON, supra note 3, at 16 (“Being much cheaper than 
direct physical or electronic surveillance [dataveillance] enables the watching of more 
people or populations, because economic constraints to surveillance are reduced. 
Dataveillance also automates surveillance. Classically, government bureaucracies have been 
most interested in gathering such data . . . .”); MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS (2007) (examining constitutional 
implications of “knowledge discovery in databases” (KDD applications) through 
dataveillance). 
 17. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 3, at 14 (“The aim of biometric identification 
technologies—like optical fingerprinting, iris scanning, and voice recognition—is to bind 
identity to the body using digital representations of unique body parts, or, in the case of 
voice printing, by capturing, digitizing, and analyzing the sounds that the body produces.”); 
Lyon, supra note 7, at 500 (“The electronic information infrastructures that permit the 
processing of our personal data depend on identification documents and protocols to mediate 
between individuals and the organizations with which we relate. The employee authenticates 
her identity with an access card to enter the workplace, the traveler shows a passport to 
board a plane, and the patient produces a health card to prove eligibility for medical services 
at the hospital. Without the card, and the databases on which it depends, identity cannot now 
be verified. Telling your story no longer suffices. It is displaying your card that counts.”). 
 18. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 3, at 13 (“These official forms of bureaucratic 
identification cobbled together a set of existing and already mediated markers of identity—
such as names, addresses, signatures, and photographs—to create a more stable and 
standardized form of identity that could be verified via the very bureaucratic apparatus that 
constitutes that identity. In short, our seemingly self-evident ‘official identities’ are in reality 
a product of bureaucratization and a relatively recent historical construction, and 
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merger provides a vehicle for normalizing the general populace’s acquiescence to 
experimental and emerging biometric ID cybersurveillance techniques since they 
now integrate with otherwise traditional forms of identity registration and identity 
confirmation protocols.19 Digitalized biometric IDs, for example, illustrate how 
such newly emerging technologies can risk normalizing and integrating mass 
cybersurveillance into the daily lives of ordinary citizens. ID documents such as 
driver’s licenses in some states and all U.S. passports are now implanted with radio 
frequency identification (RFID) technology. In recent proposals, Congress has 
considered implementing a digitalized biometric identification card—such as a 
biometric-based, “high-tech” Social Security Card—which may eventually lead to 
the development of a universal multimodal biometric database. Such a database 
would potentially require the collection of, for instance, the digital photos, 
fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA of all citizens and noncitizens. Such “high-
tech” IDs, once merged with GPS-RFID tracking technology, could facilitate a 
convergence of 24/7 body tracking and 360° biographical tracking. 
Yet, the existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is tethered to a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” test20 that does not appear to restrain the comprehensive, 
suspicionless amassing of databases that concern the biometric data, movements, 
activities, and other personally identifiable information of individuals.21 At the 
same time, most scholars agree that the Fourth Amendment should protect ordinary 
citizens from mass, suspicionless surveillance22 and cybersurveillance “fishing 
expeditions” by the government.23 Any attempt to grapple with the consequences of 
modern cybersurveillance, therefore, should attempt to delineate how surveillance 
is administratively and technologically implemented through increasingly 
normalized mechanisms of identity tracking. Consequently, it is necessary to 
consider what role, if any, the Fourth Amendment will play in restraining a rapidly 
                                                                                                                 
considerable effort has gone into designing systems that can produce and reproduce these 
identities.” (footnote omitted)). 
 19. See id. at 5 (explaining the experimental nature of biometric ID technologies, noting 
that “[a]lthough developers are making incremental improvements in algorithms and other 
dimensions of software and hardware development, so far these technologies do not work 
very well outside constrained settings”); see also BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 
viii–ix (discussing experimental nature of technologies). 
 20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 21. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (2007); Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth 
Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 11 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011); Daniel J. 
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1083 (2002). 
 22. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, 
GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.
edu/research/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: 
THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2001). 
 23. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 21, at 1107 (“[B]y obtaining private sector records, the 
government can conduct the type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the Framers feared.” (citing 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 158 (1999); Tracey Maclin, When the 
Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 9 
(1994))). 
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evolving bureaucratized cybersurveillance movement that now constitutes what 
some scholars have described as the post-9/11 “national surveillance state.”24 
In order to fully grasp the constitutional and other developing legal 
consequences of these programs, however, it is necessary to first examine the ways 
in which cybersurveillance policies and dataveillance technologies are now rapidly 
unfolding in nearly invisible ways. Specifically, in this Article, I focus on how 
digitalized biometric IDs could facilitate the convergence of cybersurveillance-
body tracking and dataveillance-biographical tracking through a single, automated, 
centralized system. As a threshold matter, I attempt to illustrate exactly how 
identity management systems are becoming increasingly integrated into our daily 
lives. This Article describes identity management policy initiatives and the 
emerging surveillance technologies they harness.25 In this Article, I initiate a 
project to explore the constitutional and other legal implications of a network of 
bureaucratized cybersurveillance programs and technologies associated with 
digitalized biometric IDs and identity management systems. Explaining the identity 
management phenomenon—and the potential surveillance capacities facilitated by 
the phenomenon—is in itself a descriptive effort that involves a certain amount of 
technical detail. Consequently, this Article is descriptive by necessity. I reserve for 
future scholarship more theoretical and prescriptive approaches to this topic. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I explain how digitalized biometric 
IDs can facilitate not only geolocational tracking, but also biometric, behavioral, 
and biographical tracking. I further describe how identity management systems are 
providing the policy rationale to push for the expansion of an effective way to 
“manage,” “secure,” and “verify” identity. Part II explains how and why the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 1 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional 
Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 489 (2006). 
 25. As an attempt to trace out the broad contours of bureaucratized cybersurveillance 
and biometric ID cybersurveillance as it is unfolding in this moment, I resort to multiple 
tables in the Article. For the sake of accessibility and to capture the breadth of the 
phenomenon, the tables are gross simplifications. Thus, this method, concededly, 
communicates only the roughest sketch of programs and technologies that are extraordinarily 
complex. For example, the tables may use terms such as “Technology,” “Program,” and 
“Entity.” These terms are imprecise. Sometimes a “Technology” is placed in the “Program” 
column, and vice versa, for ease of description and simplified communication. I attempt to 
define each briefly here as they are used in the tables. “Technology” characterizes specific 
information technologies, devices, software, mass analytics tools, etc., that can be put in the 
service of programs. “Program” refers to the implementation of technologies that serve a 
specific governmental purpose or policy objective, for example, identity management, or 
serve a specific legislative, regulatory, or executive mandate, such as E-Verify. “Entity” is a 
broad term that sometimes encompasses a technology developer or marketer; federal, state, 
or local administrative agency; a delegated user, such as a private corporation; or others 
tasked with utilizing or implementing the technology or program. In addition, because it is 
too cumbersome to list out all of the potential entities implicated for any particular program 
or technology, often a specific named “Entity” was selected for illustrative purposes, usually 
based upon which entity appeared to be the most salient at that juncture. An appendix of 
acronyms and key words is also provided at the conclusion of this Article. 
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government is taking steps toward the adoption of a digitalized national 
identification system based upon the development of a universal biometric 
database. Recent comprehensive immigration reform efforts are particularly 
instructive in this examination. Part III provides an overview of how biometric ID 
data is collected and how biometric matching technologies operate. In Part IV, I 
map out how bureaucratized surveillance is now being transformed at the dawn of 
big data and mass dataveillance through bureaucratized cybersurveillance. I 
conclude that biometric ID cybersurveillance will enable the execution of identity 
management systems in nearly invisible ways through digital means, including 
mass data collection and tracking, database screening, and data analysis. 
I. DIGITALIZED BIOMETRIC IDS AND IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
The proposal of a digitalized biometric national ID, or centralized, biometric-
based identity verification system, is still just that: simply a proposal. The reality of 
a universal digitalized biometric national ID system, particularly a “cardless” 
system,26 however, is not remote. The technologies, laws, and policies that would 
support it are currently operative. It is a proposal with political resonance in that it 
mobilizes a political and cultural desire for a certain level of homeland security. 
Especially pronounced after 9/11, there is a deep political incentive in identifying a 
method that will assist in the control of our nation’s borders and in the regulation of 
immigration policy and migration flows. 
Specifically, since 9/11, as a method to address complex social challenges and 
as a policy prescription for immigration enforcement, crime control, and 
counterterrorism, there has been a push to expand technological solutions that can 
more accurately identify and classify individuals with the minimum level of 
physical intrusiveness.27 Digitalized IDs and digitalized identity management 
systems have been proposed to meet these goals. They are structured to verify or 
secure identity, analyze ID data, and conduct identification assessments.28 These 
bureaucratized cybersurveillance technologies execute surveillance through data- 
and database-driven methodologies.29 These methodologies are facilitated by an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. See, e.g., Jim Harper, The New—Cardless!—National ID, CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG 
(June 1, 2011, 3:57 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/new-cardless-national-id. 
 27. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 3, at 425–51, 529–33. 
 28. With the advent of a digitalized civilization and Internet culture, scholars have 
contemplated how modern technologies impact identity construction, identity traceability, 
and digital identity registration protocols. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 8, at 45–54, 68–70; 
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS 
AGE 175–84 (2005). 
 29. Biometric databases, particularly DNA databases, are increasingly relied upon for a 
variety of criminal law purposes, including “DNA trawling” or “DNA fishing” for 
prosecution and conviction, as well as using DNA databases for genetic profiling to assess 
any predictive or diagnostic value. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: 
The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
70 (2007); David H. Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis 
of DNA Trawling Cases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 425 (2009) (discussing how prosecutors are 
identifying a defendant by “fishing through a database of DNA types to find a match”); 
Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough To Convict, 85 
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exponential proliferation of digitalized biometric ID programs and emerging 
identity management technologies.30 
These systems, programs, and technologies rely upon the mass analytical tools 
and the cybersurveillance technologies of big data31 and dataveillance.32 In recent 
years, data-driven surveillance technology has developed in two ways: (1) 
comprehensive geolocational cybersurveillance, or 24/7 surveillance of the body; 
and (2) comprehensive dataveillance, or 360° surveillance of the biography33—
amassing as much information as possible on an individual’s personal identity and 
history through data collection and data mining34 as well as data classification and 
analysis. Post-9/11 policies are driving the development of programs that combine 
these two methods. Newly emerging digitalized forms of identification—such as 
e-Passports, “high-tech” Social Security Cards, and smartphones—that aim to 
replace traditional paper-based identity documents, now or in the near future, may 
consolidate 24/7 body tracking with 360° biographical tracking. 
A. Digitalized Biometric Data 
Biometric technologies go hand in hand with identity management systems 
under a wide range of post-9/11 policymaking efforts.35 For example, recent 
                                                                                                                 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130 (2010). 
 30. See supra note 6. 
 31. See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A 
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013); Omer Tene 
& Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 63 (2012). 
 32. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 16, at 502–05. 
 33. Executives of Acxiom, one of the largest consumer data mining companies in the 
nation, have acknowledged in media reports that their approach is a “360-degree view” on 
consumers. Natasha Singer, You for Sale: Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technology/
acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html. 
 34. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal 
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008); Christopher Slobogin, Government 
Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, 
Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 (2008). For a history 
on databases and overview of historical attempts to secure database privacy, see generally 
GARFINKEL, supra note 3. 
 35. See JAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at vii (observing multiple post-9/11 identity 
management programs have mandated “the use of biometrics”: “the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 . . . mandated the use of biometrics in the issue 
of U.S. visas”; “the US-VISIT program (United States Visitor and Immigration Status 
Indicator Technology) that validates the travel documents of foreign visitors to the United 
States based on fingerprints”; “[t]he International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has 
unanimously recommended that its member States use Machine Readable Travel Documents 
(MRTDs) that incorporate at least the face biometric (some combination of face, fingerprint 
and iris can also be used) for purposes of verifying the identity of the passport holder”); id. at 
1–2 (suggesting that biometrics have the potential to enable the technological realization of 
more accurate identity management systems on a mass scale). Identity management as a 
policy prescription is a broad umbrella that may include multiple goals: 
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proponents of comprehensive immigration reform legislation and legislation 
proposing the mandatory expansion of E-Verify36—an Internet-driven identity 
database screening program—have previously debated how and why a “high-tech, 
biometric identification card” may be needed “to improve E-Verify.”37 In previous 
debates, specifically, it had been proposed that the government should adopt a 
“high-tech Social Security Card” that would resemble a credit card.38 Policymakers 
over the past decade, in fact, have argued that a universal digitalized biometric 
national ID system is needed to increase border security and control immigration.39 
Thus, a push to create a biometric-based and digitalized “high-tech Social Security 
                                                                                                                 
Identity management plays a critical role in a number of applications. Examples 
of such applications include regulating international border crossings, 
restricting physical access to important facilities like nuclear plants or airports, 
controlling logical access to shared [computerized and digitalized] resources 
and information, performing remote financial transactions, or distributing social 
welfare benefits. 
Id. at 1; see also IDMANAGEMENT.GOV, http://www.idmanagement.gov; BIOMETRICS 
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/. 
 36. For an overview of E-Verify and some of the legal implications of the E-Verify 
program, see Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody Cares About E-Verify (And 
Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381 (2012). 
 37. Michael D. Shear & Ashley Parker, Senators’ Plan Alters Waiting Periods for 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2013, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/03/18/us/politics/senate-groups-immigration-plan-would-alter-waiting-periods.html 
(“The bipartisan group of eight senators is also still debating how to improve E-Verify, the 
system that employers use to check the immigration status of their workers. A high-tech, 
biometric identification card was deemed too costly; instead, the group is considering an 
enhanced E-Verify system that would allow employers to use photographs to identify job 
applicants and would let workers provide answers to security questions to help prove their 
legal work status.”). Media reports have explained that members of the Senate, in recent 
discussions and negotiations on comprehensive immigration reform, decided the adoption of 
the card may be prohibitively expensive. Therefore, it appears that recent discussions have 
been focused on how to add both a biometric ID verification protocol (digital photo 
screening) as well as a biographical ID verification protocol (personally identifiable data as 
“security questions”) into the E-Verify system, rather than adopt a biometric ID card system. 
Id. In the version of the bill that was released by the Senate on April 16, 2013, however, 
Title III includes $1 billion in funding for the Social Security Administration to implement a 
“high-tech” Social Security Card and requires the DHS Secretary to explore the feasibility of 
a biometric-based employment authorization document. See infra note 192. 
 38. See, e.g., Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, Op-Ed., The Right Way to 
Mend Immigration, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2010, at A23 (although the Senators do not state 
explicitly that the card would resemble a credit card, they discuss the need to implement a 
“high-tech” Social Security Card that would allow “swiping the card through a machine” 
which suggests the card would function similarly to a credit card); see also FROOMKIN & 
WEINBERG, supra note 3. 
 39. See, e.g., GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3. “Congress and the 9/11 
Commission called for increased use of biometrics, and the White House created a cabinet-
level subcommittee to coordinate policy to deploy biometric technology across many federal 
agencies.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ENHANCING SECURITY THROUGH BIOMETRIC 
IDENTIFICATION 3 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/usvisit_
edu_biometrics_brochure_english.pdf; see also Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Fear National ID 
Cards?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2001, at 23. 
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Card” has been gaining momentum. This can be seen in the use of the word 
“biometric” on at least 24 separate instances in a proposed comprehensive 
immigration reform bill,40 discussed below. This policy trend signals the potential 
for future development of a universal biometric database for national ID and 
identity registration purposes.  
At the outset, however, it is important to note the distinction between biometric 
data that is used in a small data context and biometric data that is used in a big data 
context. In the big data cybersurveillance and dataveillance context, biometric data 
is not collected and analyzed in an individualized way as it would be in a small data 
context. For instance, the data is not collected and assessed to serve a specific 
criminal law purpose in a forensic evidence context.41 Rather, new technologies 
allow for biometric data to be harvested and used for big data analysis and identity 
management purposes, for criminals and noncriminals alike. In other words, mass 
biometric data collection and analysis facilitates mass identity registration and 
suspicionless mass tracking.42 
Table 1 describes various types of biometric data that can be utilized for 
identification purposes and for the purposes of identity assessment. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. See infra Table 6. 
 41. VACCA, supra note 3, at 244 (“DNA identification is mainly used in forensics . . . or 
more precisely, in forensics investigation.”). 
 42. GATES, supra note 3, at 15–16 (“[D]igital biometric identification represents the 
latest in a long line of efforts to stabilize and standardize identification systems [by mass 
individuation]. . . . Mass individuation is also a modern governmental strategy for security 
provision and population management, a social regulatory model that involves knowing in 
precise detail the identity of each member of the population in order to differentiate 
individuals according to variable levels of access, privilege, and risk.”). 
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Table 1. Digitalized Biometric Data43 
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and other value.46 
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nascent stages. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Based upon a review of research on the status of specific biometric technologies, 
including stages of testing, I have classified various biometric technologies as “Emerging,” 
“Experimental,” and “Speculative.” Experts and researchers generally categorize biometric 
technologies within classifications that reflect levels of commercial availability and stages of 
technological development. See, e.g., GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 136 
(distinguishing between “biometric technologies currently deployed, currently available but 
not yet deployed, or in development that could be deployed in the foreseeable future”); 
VACCA, supra note 3, at 27–39 (distinguishing between “Leading Biometric Technologies” 
that are “more widely deployed” and “Biometric Technologies Under Development” that are 
still under study). Most experts appear to agree, however, that biometric technologies are 
emerging and experimental, and they acknowledge that none have been fully tested for 
identity management purposes. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 4 
(“Many gaps exist in our understanding of the nature and extent of distinctiveness and 
stability of biometric traits across individuals and groups.”); VACCA, supra note 3, at 45 
(“While biometric technology is currently available and is used in a variety of applications, 
questions remain regarding the technical and operational effectiveness of biometric 
technologies in large-scale applications.”); GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 
58–67 (explaining the “[l]ack of [a]pplications-[d]ependent [e]valuations” that study the 
impact of biometric data usage in real-life contexts and summarizing studies showing 
“[s]usceptibility [of biometric technologies] to [d]eception”); GARFINKEL, supra note 3, at 55 
(“Despite their apparent accuracy, neither fingerprints nor DNA samples are suitable for 
identifying individuals on a day-to-day basis.”). In contrast, the usage of biometric data for 
forensic purposes has undergone more rigorous testing and has been tested over several 
decades. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 3, at 59 (asserting that biometric recognition and 
verification technologies have not been subjected to the same scientific peer review process 
as that required of DNA fingerprinting). 
 44. VACCA, supra note 3, at 11. 
 45. Id. at 32. 
 46. See infra note 128 and accompanying text; infra Part I.B.3; see also MAYER-
SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 31, at 157–63 (discussing FAST within context of 
predictive policing). 
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 47. VACCA, supra note 3, at 13. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 13. 
 51. Id. 
 52. DNA is generally not considered an established biometric data verification 
technology for several reasons. For example,  
DNA differs from standard biometrics in several ways. It compares actual 
samples rather than templates generated from samples. Also, because not all 
stages of DNA comparison are automated, the comparison cannot be made in 
real time. DNA’s use for identification is currently limited to forensic 
applications. The technology is many years away from any other kind of 
implementation and will be very intrusive. 
GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 51; see also VACCA, supra note 3, at 32. 
 53. Farahany, Searching Secrets, supra note 6, at 1281 & n.222. 
 54. Id. at 1275, 1287–88. 
 55. VACCA, supra note 3, at 32. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 32, 37. 
 58. Id. at 187. 
 59. Donohue, supra note 3, at 415. 
 60. VACCA, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
 61. Id. at 32, 34. 
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B. Identity Management Systems 
Bureaucratized cybersurveillance and biometric ID cybersurveillance encompass 
identity management systems78 that utilize geolocational, biometric, and 
biographical data. Specifically, identity management is a policy prescription. It 
relies upon identity verification, identity determination, and/or identity inference 
systems to regulate access to places or things. It also serves broader population 
tracking and screening goals for government policymaking purposes.79 The 
prescription relies upon experimental technologies and emerging methodologies. 
As such, its efficacy is uncertain and the systems have not been fully tested. 
Yet, the increasing availability of these emerging cybersurveillance and 
dataveillance technologies has allowed for the rapid and dramatic expansion of 
identity management systems since 9/11. These technologies utilize data collection 
and mining, database screening, and data analysis to reach identity management 
                                                                                                                 
 62. YUJIE DONG & DAMON L. WOODARD, EYEBROW SHAPE-BASED FEATURES FOR 
BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION AND GENDER CLASSIFICATION: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (2011), 
available at http://www.csis.pace.edu/~ctappert/dps/IJCB2011/papers/133.pdf. 
 63. VACCA, supra note 3, at 203. 
 64. Mathew J. Schwartz, Skeletal Scans Explored for Crime Fighting, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug. 26, 2010, 1:07 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/software/
information-management/skeletal-scans-explored-for-crime-fighti/227100041. 
 65.  Sara Gates, Knee Scan Identification: MRIs May Be Better Way to ID Travelers, 
Study Suggests, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/01/25/kneecap-scans-identification-biometric-id_n_2543042.html. 
 66. VACCA, supra note 3, at 32, 34. 
 67. Id. at 32, 35. 
 68. Id. at 32–33. 
 69. Id. at 32, 36. 
 70. O’HARROW, supra note 3, at 186. 
 71. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION 
BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 5 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/
privacy_pia_st_fast-a.pdf [hereinafter Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2011)]. 
 72. Pam Benson, Will Airports Screen for Body Signals? Researchers Hope So, 
CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/06/security.screening/index.
html. 
 73. Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2011), supra note 71, at 3. 
 74. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE 
ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 4 (2008), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf [hereinafter Privacy Impact 
Assessment for FAST (2008)]. 
 75. See, e.g., Allison Barrie, Homeland Security Detects Terrorist Threats by Reading 
Your Mind, FOX NEWS (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,426485,00.html. 
 76. Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2011), supra note 71, at 3. 
 77. Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2008), supra note 74, at 4. 
 78. Identity management systems utilize different techniques that are based upon what 
you have (e.g., identity cards and Social Security Numbers), what you know (e.g., 
passwords), and/or what you are (e.g., biometric data). See VACCA, supra note 3, at xvi. 
 79. See supra notes 4, 39. 
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determinations. Increasingly, these identity determinations are utilized to restrict 
access to specific rights and privileges, such as the right to fly (“No-Fly List”), the 
right to work (E-Verify), and the right to vote (Help America Vote Act of 2002 
(HAVA)). Identity management programs are also implemented to assist the 
government in taking action against certain individuals, such as determining who 
should be detained and deported (Secure Communities (S-COMM) and Future 
Attribute Screening Technology (FAST)). 
The programs can operate at multiple levels and are not mutually exclusive to 
each category. Therefore, an identity verification or determination program, such as 
E-Verify or S-COMM, can also serve identity inference objectives. Some identity 
management systems are not yet biometric-based identity verification systems. 
E-Verify, for example, currently will require a screener to enter biographical data 
for its Internet-based database screening protocols, utilizing traditional enumeration 
systems (e.g., Social Security Number). However, E-Verify offers a “Photo Tool” 
and, thus, incorporates one type of biometric data technology: digital photo and 
digitalized photo databases. As will be discussed below in more detail in Part II, it 
appears that policymakers are now attempting to expand the E-Verify database 
screening protocol to utilize a universal biometric database. Specifically, it appears 
that Congress is recommending the implementation of a universal digitalized photo 
database of all citizens and noncitizens through the mandatory national expansion 
of E-Verify and E-Verify’s Photo Tool, both of which are currently test pilot 
programs. This legislative proposal potentially suggests the future adoption of 
facial recognition technology for digitalized photo data matching. Finally, it is 
important to note that databases created to serve one kind of identity management 
system can be put to use for other identity management systems. Therefore, a 
universal digitalized photo database created for E-Verify, for instance, eventually 
could be used for S-COMM, FAST, and other database screening and identity 
determinations. 
Table 2 compares the three types of identity management systems: identity 
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systems seek to 
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through a process 
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and exclusion” and 
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 80. Experts often refer to biometric data systems as “biometric recognition,” “biometric 
identity verification,” or “biometric identification” systems. Existing discourse does not use 
the terminology of “identity verification,” “identity determination,” or “identity inference” 
systems. My departure from the terminology is to emphasize that these three differing types 
of systems are all concerned with identity management as a policy prescription, and that not 
all systems are biometric-based. Yet, they each illustrate strands of government efforts, 
sometimes separate and sometimes in coordination, to place identity under surveillance, 
including under bureaucratized cybersurveillance. Many of the nonbiometric programs are 
either in the process of transforming into biometric ID cybersurveillance programs and/or are 
relying more upon digitalized biometric IDs and other digitalized ID devices. 
 81. LYNCH, supra note 3, at 5. 
 82. Id. For clarification, I refer to these systems as “identity determination” systems, 
whereas Lynch refers to these systems as “identification” systems. Id.  
 83. ROSEN, supra note 28, at 27; see also DAVID LYON, THE ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE 
OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 197 (1994); SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, 
AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 13 (David Lyon ed., 2003). 
 84. LYNCH, supra note 3, at 5. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones That Never Forget a Face, 
WIRED.COM (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:30 AM), available at http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2011/09/drones-never-forget-a-face/ (quoting Charles River Analytics). 
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 87. LYNCH, supra note 3, at 5. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Shachtman, supra note 86 (quoting Modus Operandi, Inc.). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See infra note 348. 
 92. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. BLOSS, UNDER A WATCHFUL EYE: PRIVACY RIGHTS AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 182 (2009). 
ATS was launched in the 1990s, automated in 2002, and originally designed to 
be a cargo screening tool for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to evaluate 
materials that may pose a threat to the nation. However, Homeland Security 
officials in 2006 modified the system to create a terrorist risk rating formula 
and perform screening of both inbound and outbound cargo, travelers, and 
conveyances. The model assigns a risk assessment score . . . . ATS maintains a 
voluminous database, and its risk profiles and scores will be kept for 40 years 







                                                                                                                 
unable to be inspected or reviewed. In spite of the past inaccuracies and flaws 
with counterterrorism threat profile regimes, this ambitious program to evaluate 
and catalog millions of people and pieces of merchandise illustrates the 
comprehensive goal of this generation of data gathering. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 93. Shachtman, supra note 86. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Due to the covert nature of these operations, limited information is available on the 
exact nature of the cybersurveillance that may inform drone attacks and targeted killings in 
the “war on terror.” See generally DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S 
SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING USE OF AMERICAN POWER 241–70 (2012) (describing use of 
drones and targeted killing strategy in the “war on terror”). Recently, more information has 
emerged on the use of “signature strikes”: “a controversial [targeted killing] practice known 
as signature strikes, . . . or [targeting those with] defining characteristics associated with 
terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t necessarily known.” DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL 
OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 41 (2012). 
From media reports, it appears that signature strikes are informed in part by drone footage 
and potentially from other types of cybersurveillance. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Broader Drone 
Tactics Sought, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.washington
post.com/world/national-security/cia-seeks-new-authority-to-expand-yemen-drone-campaign
/2012/04/18/gIQAsaumRT_story.html (“The CIA is seeking authority to expand its covert 
drone campaign in Yemen by launching strikes against terrorism suspects even when it does 
not know the identities of those who could be killed, U.S. officials said. Securing permission 
to use these ‘signature strikes’ would allow the agency to hit targets based solely on 
intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior, such as imagery showing militants 
gathering at known al-Qaeda compounds or unloading explosives.”); Shachtman, supra note 
86 (describing emerging cybersurveillance and biometric cybersurveillance technologies that 
could potentially assist in identity inference programs to identify potential terrorists through 
a “system [that] would integrate data from informants’ tips, drone footage, and captured 
phone calls”); Lev Grossman, Drone Home: They Fight for America Abroad, But What 
Happens When Drones Return Home?, TIME, Feb.11, 2013, at 26, 30 (“According to reports 
in the New York Times and elsewhere, the Obama Administration conducts so-called 
signature strikes, which are aimed not at specific high-level targets but at any person or 
people whose behavior conforms to certain suspicious patterns.”). “[T]he vast majority of 
drone attacks conducted by the United States have been signature strikes[.]” Kevin Jon 
Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’: Signature Strikes and International Law, 11 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 89, 89 (2013); see also Scott Shane, Rights Groups, in Letter to Obama, 
Question Legality and Secrecy of Drone Killings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2013, at A9, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/us/politics/rights-groups-question-legality-
of-targeted-killing.html (“Ms. Schakowsky [Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.)] was prompted to 
question Mr. Brennan [John O. Brennan, Director of CIA] in part by an article this week by 
McClatchy News Service reporting that it had obtained classified government documents 
showing that the drone strikes had killed hundreds of low-level suspected militants whose 
identities were not known.”); Scott Shane, Election Spurred a Move To Codify U.S. Drone 
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/
world/white-house-presses-for-drone-rule-book.html (“[T]he word evolved to mean the 
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To help concretely frame each of type of identity program within the system, I 
will briefly describe three DHS identity management programs: E-Verify (identity 
verification), S-COMM (identity determination), and FAST (identity inference). 
Although E-Verify appears to be poised for mandatory national expansion through 
recently proposed immigration reform legislation, and S-COMM has already been 
mandated nationally as of 2013 through executive mandate, all three programs are 
based upon emerging, experimental, or speculative technologies. All three can be 
fairly characterized, therefore, as test pilot programs. 
1. Identity Verification 
“Under a[n identity] verification system, an individual presents herself as a 
specific person (‘I am Jennifer’). The system checks her biometric (such as an iris 
scan) against the biometric already in the database linked to that person’s file 
(Jennifer’s iris print) to try to find a match.”96 For example, “[t]he E‐Verify 
program . . . is a verification‐based system.”97 The E-Verify program is currently a 
voluntary test pilot program.98 Multiple state immigration laws, however, are now 
mandating that employers use E-Verify.99 Under Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting, the Court upheld an Arizona statute, the Legal Arizona Workers Act, that 
requires all employers in the state of Arizona to conduct E-Verify Internet database 
screening on all new hires.100 
                                                                                                                 
‘signature’ or militants in general—for instance, young men toting arms in an area controlled 
by extremist groups. Such strikes have prompted the greatest conflict inside the Obama 
administration, with some officials questioning whether killing unidentified fighters is 
legally justified or worth the local backlash.”). 
 96. LYNCH, supra note 3, at 5. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011) (“Originally 
known as the ‘Basic Pilot Program,’ E–Verify ‘is an internet-based system that allows an 
employer to verify an employee’s work-authorization status.’” (quoting Chicanos Por La 
Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 2009))). Congress expressly 
prohibited DHS from requiring private employers to use E-Verify on anything other than a 
voluntary basis. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 402, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-656 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a); 
see also Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (“‘[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security may not 
require any person or . . . entity [outside the Federal Government] to participate in a pilot 
program’ such as E-Verify.” (quoting the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 § 402(a))); Hu, supra note 13, at 579–99. 
 99. Hu, supra note 13, at 608–09 (“The state-by-state patchwork of E-Verify schemes is 
especially problematic, as several states require some or all employers use E-Verify. 
Alabama, Arizona, and Mississippi require all employers to use E-Verify. Georgia, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah require most employers to 
use E-Verify. . . . Many other states require subsets of employers—such as public employers, 
contractors, and subcontractors—to enroll in E-Verify. These states include Colorado, 
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
West Virginia.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 100. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (holding that Arizona immigration statute requiring 
employers engage in mandatory E-Verify database screening is not preempted by federal 
immigration law because federal law only prohibits federal government from mandating 
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The E-Verify system is complex, relying upon statistical algorithms and 
multiple databases in order to conclude that the identity and citizenship status of an 
individual has been sufficiently “verified.”101 To oversimplify, however, one can 
say that E-Verify works in the following way. First, after an employer receives the 
E-Verify online software program from DHS, an employer collects personally 
identifiable data from an employee (e.g., name, date of birth, and Social Security 
Number).102 Next, this information is entered by the employer or an employer’s 
“designated agent” into a software program that is accessible online, free of cost.103 
The software runs the data first through the SSA database and then through DHS 
immigration databases.104 The program informs the employer within seconds 
whether an individual is “confirmed” or “verified.”105 If there is an anomalous 
result in the database screening algorithms, however, the individual falls within a 
category titled “Tentative Nonconfirmation” (TNC).106 Pursuant to the guidelines 
set forth by the program, an employer is then required to allow an employee to 
contest the TNC result.107 An employee must contact DHS or SSA within eight 
business days to resolve the TNC result. If an employee is unable to resolve the 
                                                                                                                 
E-Verify, and nothing in the federal law prohibits states from mandating E-Verify). The 
Court concluded, “[t]he provision of IIRIRA setting up the program that includes E-Verify 
contains no language circumscribing state action. It does, however, constrain federal 
action[.]” Id.; see also Hu, supra note 13, at 598–99. 
 101. See, e.g., WESTAT, WESTAT EVALUATION OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM: USCIS 
SYNOPSIS OF KEY FINDINGS AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS (2010), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Native%20Docs/Westat%20Evaluation%20of%20the%20E-Verify%
20Program.pdf; E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 34–35 (2011) (written testimony of Theresa C. Bertucci, Assoc. Dir., Enter. Servs. 
Directorate, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.). 
 102. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., I AM AN EMPLOYER: HOW DO I . . . USE E-
VERIFY? 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/E4en.pdf. 
 103. Id. 
 104. The Social Security Administration maintains the Numerical Identification File 
(NUMIDENT) Social Security Number database, which includes the name, date of birth, and 
other biographical information of Social Security Administration applicants. ANDORRA 
BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40446, ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY 
VERIFICATION 2 (2009). United States Citizenship and Immigration Services maintains the 
Verification Information System (VIS) database, which is “comprised of citizenship, 
immigration, and employment status information from several DHS System of Records.” 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE VERIFICATION INFORMATION SYSTEM SUPPORTING VERIFICATION 
PROGRAMS 2 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_
uscis_vis.pdf. 




 106. Id. 
 107. Employee Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. 
(Sept. 14, 2012), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243
c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=7279fb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextcha
nnel=7279fb41c8596210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD. 
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TNC within eight business days, the system generates a “Final Nonconfirmation” 
(FNC) result, and an employer can terminate the employee.108 
While E-Verify does not involve an algorithmic biometric data matching 
component, E-Verify does offer a biometric-driven identification tool: the E-Verify 
Photo Tool. Some policymakers argue that the E-Verify identity verification 
program should be expanded to include a biometric data matching component (e.g., 
matching a digital photo, fingerprint, or iris scan to universal government 
database(s)).109 A biometric E-Verify program would thus offer a policy parallel to 
the biometric identity determination component of Secure Communities (S-
COMM).  
2. Identity Determination 
S-COMM is an immigration status check program that facilitates federal 
government fingerprint database matching through biometric data collection by 
local and state law enforcement.110 S-COMM is described as an identity 
determination program.111 Identity determination systems seek to identify an 
individual’s identity through processing either collected data (e.g., fingerprints 
scanned) or captured data (e.g., facial recognition technology using digital photos 
captured over the Internet or from video) through existing databases.112 Identity 
determination systems are different from identity verification systems in important 
ways. Identity determination systems can be distinguished from identity 
“verification systems because an [identity determination] system seeks to identify 
an unknown person (or unknown biometric).”113 S-COMM can be fairly described 
as a mandatory, test pilot program.114 As of 2013, all state and local law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. DHS TNCs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid
=420d479347ea6210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=420d479347ea6210
VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCRD; see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE E-VERIFY 
PROGRAM FOR EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING art. II.C.10 
(2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/Customer%20Support/Employer
%20MOU%20(September%202009).pdf (“If the employee does not choose to contest a 
tentative nonconfirmation or a photo non-match or if a secondary verification is completed 
and a final nonconfirmation is issued, then the Employer can find the employee is not work 
authorized and terminate the employee’s employment.”). 
 109. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-146, EMPLOYMENT 
VERIFICATION: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT 
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES REMAIN 3 (2010) [hereinafter GAO EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION]. 
 110. LYNCH, supra note 3, at 3, 9. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 5. 
 113. Id. 
 114. S-COMM began as a test pilot program in fourteen jurisdictions in October 2008. 
AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON 
LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf. In 2010, before the efficacy of the program 
could be fully assessed, however, DHS determined that all state and local law enforcement 
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enforcement jurisdictions must participate in requisite biometric data collection and 
database screening protocols pursuant to DHS mandate.115 
Multiple state immigration laws are now mandating the expansion of data 
collection and database screening as a part of state and local identity management 
policymaking.116 In particular, some state immigration laws now require state and 
local law enforcement officials to engage in the biometric data screening protocols 
that are operative in S-COMM, but in a way that encompasses a broader population 
than those targeted by S-COMM.117 Under Arizona v. United States, for instance, 
the Court upheld Section 2(B) of the highly controversial Arizona Senate Bill 1070 
(SB 1070), also referred to in the media as the “racial profiling” law and the “show 
                                                                                                                 
agencies would be required to implement S-COMM by 2013. See Memorandum from Riah 
Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, for Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, on Secure Communities – Mandatory in 2013 (Oct. 2, 
2010), available at http://images.politico.com/global/2012/01/icefoiaoptoutdocs.pdf; see 
also Julia Preston, Resistance Widens to Obama Initiative on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2011, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/politics/
13secure.html. 
 115. See Kirk Semple & Julia Preston, Deal To Share Fingerprints Is Dropped, Not 
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
08/06/us/06immig.html; supra note 114. 
 116. For example, Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) includes such a database 
screening provision, Section 2(B), in the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe 
Neighborhoods Act, ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11, 13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 
211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070. Specifically, Section 2(B) is codified in ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012). For an overview of Section 2(B), see Hu, supra note 13, at 596–
604. 
 117. Section 2(B) of SB 1070, for instance, uses the same database screening protocol as 
S-COMM pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) and mandates this database screening protocol 
through express incorporation of the federal immigration statute into the language of the 
state immigration statute.  
Section 2(B) of S.B. 1070 provides that, when Arizona law enforcement 
officers reasonably suspect that a person they have lawfully stopped, detained, 
or arrested is unlawfully present, “a reasonable attempt shall be made, when 
practicable, to determine the immigration status of the person” pursuant to the 
verification procedure established by Congress in 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c). 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012)). Specifically, 
8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) allows the state to conduct 
an immigration status check and seek database-driven information from DHS to determine 
whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States. 
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c), DHS is required to “respond to an inquiry by a 
Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the 
citizenship or immigration status . . . for any purpose authorized by law, by 
providing the requested verification or status information.” DHS has, in its 
discretion, set up LESC [Law Enforcement Support Center], which is 
administered by ICE and “serves as a national enforcement operations center 
that promptly provides immigration status and identity information to local, 
state, and federal law enforcement agencies regarding aliens suspected of, 
arrested for, or convicted of criminal activity.” 
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995 (D. Ariz. 2010). 
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me your papers” law.118 Section 2(B) requires Arizona law enforcement officials to 
engage in mandatory biometric data collection and database screening of those 
suspected of unlawful presence, following the same screening protocols as S-
COMM.119 In contrast, S-COMM targets only arrestees. 
S-COMM, as an identity determination system, requires local and state law 
enforcement agencies to run biometric and biographical data of arrestees through 
federal government databases to determine an individual’s identity. Although a 
gross simplification, S-COMM works in the following way. After an arrest, a local 
law enforcement agency (LEA) scans and submits the fingerprints of an arrestee to 
be checked against FBI and DHS databases.120 If there is a fingerprint match, the 
FBI sends an Immigration Alien Query (IAQ) to the Law Enforcement Support 
Center (LESC) that is managed by DHS’s U.S. Immigration and Customs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–10 (holding that it was improper to enjoin Section 2(B) 
on preemption grounds because “if § 2(B) only requires state officers to conduct a status 
check during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been 
released, the provision likely would survive preemption—at least absent some showing that 
it has other consequences that are adverse to federal law and its objectives”). 
 119. See Hu, supra note 13, at 594 (“In Section 2(B) of SB 1070, Arizona mandates that 
local law enforcement determine—during the course of any lawful stop, arrest, or 
detention—whether an individual is lawfully present in the U.S., if the officer has reasonable 
cause to believe the individual may be unlawfully present. Section 2(B), as upheld in 
Arizona, first requires an inspection of physical documents (e.g., driver’s license or 
immigration document). A follow-up database screening is mandated under Section 2(B) if 
an inspection of the physical identity document cannot confirm an individual’s identity and 
citizenship status.”). 
 120. The FBI maintains the IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification 
System) database. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis. DHS 
maintains the IDENT (Automated Biometric Identification System) database. “IDENT is a 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-wide system for the collection and processing of 
biometric and limited biographic information for DHS . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 
(IDENT) 2 (2006) [hereinafter IDENT PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf. The 
database screening process can be summarized as follows: “1.  .  .  . [T]he arresting LEA 
[law enforcement agency] sends the subject’s fingerprints and associated biographical 
information to CJIS [Criminal Justice Information Services]/IAFIS . . . . 2. CJIS 
electronically routes the subject’s biometric and biographic information for all criminal 
answer required (CAR) transactions to US-VISIT/IDENT to determine if there is a 
fingerprint match with records in that system.” U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS FOURTH QUARTER 2–3 (2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy104thquarter
.pdf. 
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Enforcement (ICE).121 The LESC staff research multiple databases to determine 
whether someone should be subject to detention and deportation.122 
3. Identity Inference 
An identity inference program allows for the government and its delegates to 
infer threat risk, for instance potential criminality or terroristic threat risk. The 
Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) is an example of an identity 
inference program.123 FAST is currently under testing by DHS and has been 
described in press reports as a “precrime” program.124 If implemented, FAST will 
purportedly rely upon complex statistical algorithms that can aggregate data from 
multiple databases in an attempt to “predict” future criminal or terrorist acts, most 
likely through stealth cybersurveillance and covert data monitoring of ordinary 
citizens.125 The FAST program purports to assess whether an individual might pose 
a “precrime” threat through the capture of a range of data, including biometric 
data.126 In other words, FAST attempts to infer the security threat risk of future 
criminals and terrorists through data analysis. 
Under FAST, biometric-based physiological and behavioral cues are captured 
through the following types of biometric data: body and eye movements, eye blink 
rate and pupil variation, body heat changes, and breathing patterns.127 Biometric-
based linguistic cues include the capture of the following types of biometric data: 
voice pitch changes, alterations in rhythm, and changes in intonations of speech.128 
Documents released by DHS indicate that individuals could be arrested and face 
other serious consequences based upon statistical algorithms and predictive 
analytical assessments.129 Specifically, projected consequences of FAST “can range 
from none to being temporarily detained to deportation, prison, or death.”130 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) 
SECURE COMMUNITIES (SC) STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) 4 (2009), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesops93009.pdf. 
 122. Id. at 4–5. 
 123. See Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2008), supra note 74. 
 124. See Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) Project FOIA Request, EPIC, 
http://epic.org/privacy/fastproject/; Declan McCullagh, Homeland Security Moves Forward 
with ‘Pre-Crime’ Detection, CNET NEWS (Oct. 7, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/
8301-31921_3-20117058-281/homeland-security-moves-forward-with-pre-crime-detection/. 
 125. See McCullagh, supra note 124; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Presentation: Future 
Attribute Screening Technology (July 28, 2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
fastpresentation.pdf. 
 126. See McCullagh, supra note 124. 
 127. Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2008), supra note 74, at 4; Future Attribute 
Screening Technology (FAST) Project FOIA Request, supra note 124; U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., supra note 125. 
 128. Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2008), supra note 74, at 4; McCullagh, supra 
note 124; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 125. 
 129. Privacy Impact Assessment for FAST (2008), supra note 74, at 2. 
 130. Id. 
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C. Cybersurveillance and Dataveillance Capacities of Digitalized Biometric IDs 
Identity management systems encourage the expansion of digitalized ID trackers 
that can serve as unique identifiers or data signatures. This allows for the more 
efficient identification of individuals during in-person encounters or through virtual 
encounters. These encounters allow the government or its delegates to conduct 
database screening and then take action, for example, based upon data matches131 
or data mismatches132 which are considered suspicious. The discussion below 
explains how digitalized biometric IDs can serve not only as a traditional form of 
identity registration (e.g., providing biographical data through driver’s license 
application and passport application), but now also may serve a variety of tracking 
functions under emerging technologies, including geolocational, biometric, 
behavioral, and biographical tracking. 
1. Digitalized Biometric IDs: Geolocational Tracking 
To understand the emerging tracking capacities of IDs that can be embedded 
with radio frequency identification (RFID)—such as passports, driver’s licenses, 
and “high-tech” Social Security Cards—a brief introduction to RFID technology is 
necessary. The advent of RFID technology has added a geolocational surveillance 
angle to modern identification credentialing programs.133 RFID allows for the 
monitoring of an individual’s movement through hand-held devices as well as other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Data matches trigger heightened suspicion in data and database screenings pursuant 
to S-COMM and the No-Fly List. See, e.g., Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & 
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (explaining that if a 
match is detected through the screening process, “ICE then reviews other databases to 
determine whether the person is here illegally or is otherwise removable”); “False Match” 
Shows No-Fly List Isn’t Perfect, CBS NEWS (May 6, 2010, 2:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.
com/2100-201_162-6466411.html. 
 132. Data mismatches trigger heightened suspicion under the database screening 
protocols in E-Verify and HAVA. See, e.g., Statement for the Record: E-Verify, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (May 20, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=bca6fa693660a110VgnVCM10
00004718190aRCRD (“In almost every case, a mismatch will occur either because the 
employee is actually not authorized to work . . . ; because the employee has not yet updated 
his or her records with SSA . . . ; or because the employer made an error inputting 
information into the system.”); see also Senate Bill Implementing Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA) Would Disenfranchise Thousands of New Yorkers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT 
N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/
senate-bill-implementing-help-america-vote-act-hava-would-disenfranchise-thousands-new 
(describing how Social Security Number mismatches under HAVA database screening can 
disenfranchise voters). 
 133. See BILL GLOVER & HIMANSHU BHATT, RFID ESSENTIALS 30–31, 55 (2006). RFID 
tags can either be passive or active. Id. at 58. Active tags are powered internally, while 
passive tags are briefly activated by the radio frequency scan of the reader. Id. See Alírio J. 
Soares Boaventura & Nuno Borges Carvalho, Extending Reading Range of Commercial 
RFID Readers, 61 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MICROWAVE THEORY & TECHS. 633 (2013), 
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=6376259. 
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tracking devices. That technology renders GPS surveillance moot in some 
circumstances, or allows for the augmentation of GPS-like geolocational tracking 
in other circumstances,134 because it enables the insertion of what is in effect a 
personal tracking device into identity cards that people may carry out of necessity 
or by requirement of the law (e.g., a driver’s license). 
ID documents such as driver’s licenses in some states and all U.S. passports are 
now implanted with RFID technology. Since 2007, each U.S. passport is now 
implanted with an RFID chip in the booklet’s back cover.135 Additionally, the 
REAL ID Act of 2005 requires the inclusion of “common machine-readable 
technology” in all REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses.136 Several states now 
issue RFID “enhanced driver’s licenses,” including Michigan, New York, Vermont, 
and Washington.137 
Emergency response personnel in some jurisdictions now carry enhanced 
identification cards that are outfitted with RFID technology in order to facilitate the 
location and identification of personnel in emergency situations.138 The human 
implantation of RFID microchips is now FDA approved.139 New RFID technology 
                                                                                                                 
 
 134. See, e.g., Ennovasys Announces Its RFID-GPS Integrated Solution To Improve the 
Safety of School Children – TrakSchool™, PRWEB (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.prweb.com/
releases/2011/8/prweb8712635.htm (TrakSchool technology allows parents and school 
authorities to monitor the whereabouts of children using a GPS-RFID device and proprietary 
software that allows for the visualization of this data). 
 135. U.S. passports contain RFID chips “encoded with the bearer’s personal information 
printed on the data page, a digitized version of the bearer’s photograph, a unique chip 
number, and a digital signature to protect the integrity of the stored information.” 22 C.F.R. 
§ 51.1(b) (2012). 
 136. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(a)(1), (b)(8)–(9), 119 Stat. 302, 
312. Although the REAL ID Act does not require the inclusion of RFID technology in 
REAL ID-compliant driver’s licenses, it appears that Congress has authorized the DHS 
Secretary to impose such a requirement through administrative rulemaking. Id. § 205(a), 119 
Stat. at 315 (“All authority to issue regulations, set standards, and issue grants under this title 
shall be carried out by the [DHS] Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Transportation and the States.”); see also Anita Ramasastry, Why the ‘Real ID’ Act Is a Real 
Mess, CNN.COM (Aug. 12, 2005, 2:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/08/12/
ramasastry.ids/index.html (“In the past, the Department of Homeland Security has indicated 
it likes the concept of RFID chips.”). 
 137. Enhanced Drivers Licenses: What Are They?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/enhanced-drivers-licenses-what-are-they. 
 138. See Tiffany Fox, Go-Anywhere Tracking of First Responders with WIISARD Radio-
Frequency System, PHYS.ORG (Nov. 11, 2010), http://phys.org/news/2010-11-go-anywhere-
tracking-wiisard-radio-frequency.html; New First Response RFID System Developed, 
HOMELAND SEC. NEWS WIRE (Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/
new-first-response-rfid-system-developed. 
 139. VeriChip Corporation received FDA approval for human implantation of the 
VeriChip RFID microchip in 2004. Todd Lewan, Chip Implants Linked to Animal Tumors, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2007, 2:04 PM), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090800997_pf.html (explaining chip implant was 
approved by FDA in December 2004 despite tests that indicated that the technology was 
unsafe) (“The FDA is overseen by the Department of Health and Human Services, which, at 
the time of VeriChip’s approval, was headed by Tommy Thompson. Two weeks after the 
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is being tested on human volunteers who are willing to be “chipped” through 
surgical implantation of the microchip in the body.140 
According to reports, the RFID tracking device embedded in U.S. passports can 
be read from a distance of around 20 feet.141 In response to criticism that data on 
U.S. passports could be maliciously or inadvertently stolen, the U.S. Department of 
State upgraded the protection of the RFID-enhanced U.S. passports to incorporate a 
thin metal lining to make it more difficult for unauthorized readers to “skim” or 
“steal” the information encoded on the RFID chip.142 Reports describing security 
measures taken to protect the information encoded on the RFID chip have 
explained that the State Department has adopted a Basic Access Control (BAC) 
system, which apparently functions as a Personal Identification Number (PIN) that 
must be entered into an RFID reader before the chip can be read.143 The BAC 
purports to encrypt all communications between the RFID chip and the 
“interrogator” of the chip information.144 
The RFID passports are interoperable with the systems of other nations, 
complying with the standards and technological specifications developed by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).145 The ICAO requires a 
minimum capacity of thirty-two kilobytes of memory for storage on the passport 
RFID chip.146 However, the U.S. Department of State has included a chip that has 
sixty-four kilobytes of memory, double the minimum required data storage 
capacity.147 The State Department has explained that the purpose for this extra 
storage is to allow for the implantation of additional biometric data,148 such as 
fingerprints, iris scans, and potentially DNA. According to press reports, “[b]efore 
the department adds additional data or biometric identifier other than a digitized 
                                                                                                                 
device’s approval took effect on Jan. 10, 2005, Thompson left his Cabinet post, and within 
five months was a board member of VeriChip Corp. and Applied Digital Solutions. He was 
compensated in cash and stock options.”). 
 140. See David Streitfeld, First Humans To Receive ID Chips; Technology: Device 
Injected Under the Skin Will Provide Identification and Medical Information, L.A. TIMES, 
May 9, 2002.  
 141. Chris Corum, Contactless Inlays from SMARTRAC Ordered for US ePassport 
Project, SECUREIDNEWS (Nov. 30, 2006), http:// secureidnews.com/news-item/contactless-
inlays-from-smartrac-ordered-for-us-epassport-project/; Tom Corelis, U.S. State Department 
Approves RFID Passports Amidst Privacy Concerns, DAILYTECH (Jan. 4, 2008, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.dailytech.com/US+State+Department+Approves+RFID+Passports+Amidst+Priv
acy+Concerns/article10200.htm (pointing out that the new passports are “[r]eadable at up to 
20 feet”). 
 142. Summary of Baird RFID Monthly for August, RFID JOURNAL (Aug. 21, 2006), 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?6562 (explaining that RFID “passports will 
incorporate a thin metal lining to prevent unauthorized readers from ‘skimming’ information 
when the passport is closed”). 
 143. Electronic Passport, 70 Fed. Reg. 61,553, 61,554 (Oct. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 
22 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 61,553. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Paul Prince, United States Sets Date for E-Passports, RFIDJOURNAL.COM (Oct. 25, 
2005), http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1951/1/132/. 
 148. See id. 
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photograph, however, it says it will seek public comment through a new rule-
making process.”149 
It is also important to place RFID tracking within this context: RFID and GPS 
satellite tracking technologies are merging.150 Therefore, ID documents have the 
potential to serve comprehensive 24/7 geolocational surveillance purposes. This 
requires a radical rethinking of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because ID 
surveillance tracking of the body and biography can be conducted 
comprehensively, virtually, and near invisibly. Thus, ID documents implanted with 
GPS-RFID technology may likely provide the government with the capacity to 
conduct continuous or near-continuous geospatial monitoring, as well as 
biographical tracking, through such IDs.151  
2. Digitalized Biometric IDs: Biometric Tracking 
In the years after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush signed several 
dozen executive orders entitled “Homeland Security Presidential Directives” 
(HSPDs) or “National Security Presidential Directives” (NSPDs).152 Among these, 
HSPD-12 is the most relevant to this Article. HSPD-12 created a digitalized 
biometric ID credentialing requirement for federal government workers and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. RFID and GPS technologies are merging in that more and more devices appear to 
incorporate both RFID tracking and GPS tracking capacities in a single device. See Manon 
G. Guillemette, Isabelle Fontaine & Claude Caron, Hybrid RFID-GPS Real-Time Location 
System for Human Resources: Development, Impacts and Perspectives, Proceedings of the 
41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (2008); David H. 
Williams & Gary Hartwig, How Will the Convergence of Location Technologies Such as 
RFID, GPS, RTLS, and LBS Affect Business?, NBIZ MAG., Summer 2008, at 23, available at 
http://www.nbizmag.com/magarticles/rfid.pdf; CS101 Handheld RFID Reader Adds GPS & 
Cellular Communication, RFID.NET (Feb. 8, 2012), http://rfid.net/product-listing/reviews/
176-csl-cs101-handheld-reader; see also Beth Bacheldor, Hybrid Tag Includes Active RFID, 
GPS, Satellite and Sensors, RFIDJOURNAL.COM (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.rfidjournal
.com/article/view/4635. 
 151. Ironically, however, experts also note that those who fall outside of the law will not 
possess such documents and will not be subject to this cybersurveillance. See HARPER, supra 
note 8, at 209 (explaining that terrorists have traditionally used legitimate documents) (“As 
we have seen, terrorists in the United States have made spare use of false identification or 
anonymity and, when they have, it has minimized their effectiveness.”). 
 152. In addition to HSPD-12, President Bush signed at least three additional HSPDs that 
relate to biometric screening technology either implicitly or explicitly: HSPD-6, HSPD-11, 
and HSPD-24. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6—Integration and Use 
of Screening Information To Protect Against Terrorism, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1174–75 (Sept. 16, 
2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-
doc-pg1174.pdf; Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11—Directive on 
Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1763–65 (Aug. 27, 
2004), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-book2/pdf/PPP-2004-book2-
doc-pg1763.pdf; Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-24—Directive on 
Biometrics for Identification and Screening To Enhance National Security, 44 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 788 (June 5, 2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-
2008-06-09/pdf/WCPD-2008-06-09-Pg788-2.pdf. 
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contractors. Specifically, HSPD-12, entitled Policy for a Common Identification 
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, required the establishment of a 
government-wide minimum standard for the issuance of a secure identification card 
or uniform identification credential to all federal employees and all government 
contractors.153 HSPD-12, however, did not specify how to achieve that goal. The 
U.S. Department of Commerce and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) subsequently concluded HSPD-12 required the development 
and issuance of a personal identity verification (PIV) digitalized ID card containing 
biometric and other personal data.154 The PIV card is machine readable and records 
points of entry and exit by federal employees and contractors.155 The PIV card 
provides an example of a digitalized biometric ID card that has already been fully 
implemented. 
The PIV card required by HSPD-12 is known in the identity management 
industry as a “smart card.” The Smart Card Alliance is a coalition of industry 
partners that promote public and private sector use of smart cards for a variety of 
purposes.156 The Alliance defines a smart card in this way: 
A smart card is a device that includes an embedded integrated circuit 
chip (ICC) that can be either a secure microcontroller or equivalent 
intelligence with internal memory or a memory chip alone. The card 
connects to a reader with direct physical contact or with a remote 
contactless radio frequency interface. With an embedded 
microcontroller, smart cards have the unique ability to store large 
amounts of data, carry out their own on-card functions (e.g., encryption 
and mutual authentication) and interact intelligently with a smart card 
reader. Smart card technology conforms to international standards 
(ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443) and is available in a variety of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 153. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-12—Policy for a Common 
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1765–67 
(Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter HSPD-12], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-
2004-book2/pdf/PPP-2004-book2-doc-pg1765.pdf. 
 154. About Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors, 
COMPUTER SEC. RES. CTR., http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/index.html . 
 155. Memorandum from Karen S. Evans, Adm’r, Office of E-Government & Info. Tech., 
for the Chief Information Officers on Sample Privacy Documents for Agency 
Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, at 9 (Feb. 17, 
2006), available at http://159.142.166.204/Documents/Sample_Privacy_Documents_for_
HSPD-12.pdf. Each federal agency was directed to develop a background check and 
credentialing program pursuant to HSPD-12 prior to issuing the PIV card to federal 
employees and contractors. Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir., Office of Mgmt. and 
Budget, for the Heads of All Departments and Agencies on Implementation of Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 – Policy for a Common Identification Standard 
for Federal Employees and Contractors (Aug. 5, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 OMB 
Memorandum], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/
fy2005/m05-24.pdf. 
 156. About the Alliance: Overview, SMART CARD ALLIANCE, http://www.smartcard
alliance.org/pages/alliance. 
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form factors, including plastic cards, fobs, subscriber identity modules 
(SIMs) used in GSM mobile phones, and USB-based tokens.157 
In the case of the government PIV card, the smart card is an employee-carried 
ID that contains biometric data. The card is machine readable, and the employee 
brings the card into contact with a machine at workplace checkpoints to gain 
entrance.158 The HSPD-12 PIV card, however, is not the only biometric ID card 
that is currently being implemented by the federal government and state 
governments.  
Table 3 provides examples of credentialing programs that require the collection 
of digitalized biometric data to support the ID card. Programs such as HSPD-12’s 
PIV card (scanned fingerprints and digital photograph), and REAL ID driver’s 
licenses and e-Passports (digital photograph), are particularly important because 
they may serve as prototypes for future digitalized biometric ID credentialing 
systems (“high-tech” Social Security Cards or biometric E-Verify system). 
Table 3. Examples of Biometric ID Credentialing Programs 
Program Entity Description 
Personal Identification 
Verification (PIV) card, 
or digitalized biometric 






Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST)/Office 
of Personnel Management 
(OPM)160 
Biometric ID 
credentialing program and 
background check for all 
federal workers and 
federal contractors under 
private employers. 
Biometric data collected: 






Administration (TSA) /U.S. 
Coast Guard  
Biometric ID 
credentialing program for 
the maritime 
transportation system. 
Biometric data collected: 
fingerprints and digital 
photographs.163 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. Smart Card Primer, SMART CARD ALLIANCE, http://www.smartcardalliance.org/
pages/smart-cards-intro-primer. 
 158. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) 
OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS 50 (2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/fips/fips201-1/FIPS-201-1-chng1.pdf. 
 159. HSPD-12, supra note 153. 
 160. All federal agencies are required to implement HSPD-12. See 2005 OMB 
Memorandum, supra note 155. 
 161. See HSPD-12, supra note 153. 
 162. Established through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-295, § 102, 116 Stat. 2064, 2073 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 70105). 
 163. Program Information, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http:// http://www.tsa.gov/
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Border Crossing Card 
(BCC)164 
DHS Biometric ID 
credentialing program to 
facilitate border crossing 
between U.S. and Mexico 
border.165 Biometric data 









credentialing program for 
lawful immigrants (e.g., 
Temporary Protected 
Status immigrants). 
Biometric data collected: 
fingerprints and digital 
photographs.167 
Lawful Permanent 
Resident Card (Green 
Card) 
USCIS Biometric data collected: 
fingerprints and digital 
photographs.168 
U.S. Passport and 
e-Passport 
U.S. Department of State 
(DoS)
Biometric data collected: 
digital photographs.169 
REAL ID Driver’s 
License170 




DoS Biometric ID 
credentialing program for 
those requiring DoS ID 
cards. Biometric data 
                                                                                                                 
stakeholders/program-information. 
 164. The legal basis for the issuance of Border Crossing cards is the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 104, 110 Stat. 
3009-546, 3009-555 to 3009-556 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(6)). 
 165. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Border Crossing Card, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.
state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_1266.html. 
 166. Jennifer 8. Lee, Progress Seen in Border Tests of ID System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
2003, at 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/07/politics/07IMMI.html (“ID 
cards [are] encrypted with digital photos, signatures, biographical information and 
fingerprints . . . .”). 
 167. See Dawn M. Lurie & Lindsey Baldwin, USCIS’ Fraud Detection Efforts Continue: 
Employment Authorization Document and Permanent Residence Card Redesigned, 
GREENBERGTRAURIG (June 2010), http://www2.gtlaw.com/practices/immigration/
compliance/pdf/GTAlert_USCIS_Fraud_June2010.pdf. 
 168. See News Release, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., USCIS to Issue 
Redesigned Green Card (May 11, 2010), available at http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?docid=31962. 
 169. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Digital Image Requirements, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/visaphotoreq/digitalimagereq/digitalimagereq_5327.html. 
 170. As required under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 171. Id. § 202(b)(5), 119 Stat. at 312; see also 6 C.F.R. § 37.17(e) (2012). 
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collected: fingerprints and 
digital photographs.172 
3. Digitalized Biometric IDs: Biographical Tracking 
Besides accumulating data regarding geolocational movements and serving as a 
vehicle for biometric data collection, digitalized biometric IDs are increasingly able 
to harvest general behavioral and biographical data that can help piece together a 
picture of the sum of personal habits and activities. “Smart card” technology now 
allows for the integration and aggregation of data across public and private 
systems.173 The incorporation of smart card technology into products (e.g., credit 
and debit cards) and IDs allows for a more seamless integration of mass 
dataveillance capacity by both the federal government and the private sector.  
A proliferation of smart card technology has increased the use of such digital ID 
technology to restrict not only physical access but “logical access” as well.174 
“Logical access” restriction can limit one’s ability to access computer and Internet 
services, telecommunication devices, vehicles, ATM machines, and other products 
that can be keyed to a smart card as a matter of security.175 Therefore, the 
interoperability of smart cards across multiple private and public sector platforms 
increases the capacity of both cybersurveillance and dataveillance. Logical access 
restriction further allows both the public and private sectors to more accurately 
pinpoint personally identifiable data and to develop profiles of individuals’ 
histories and records of activities.  
Table 4 shows that public and private entities can increasingly rely upon smart 
cards to restrict logical access as well as physical access.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM (IDMS) (2009), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
122507.pdf; STATE–72 Identity Management System (IDMS), 71 Fed. Reg. 62,653 (Oct. 
26, 2006). 
 173. Integration and aggregation of data is made possible by technological 
interoperability and the development of compatible public and private systems. See, e.g., 
SMART CARD ALLIANCE, PRIVACY AND SECURE IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS: THE ROLE OF 
SMART CARDS AS A PRIVACY-ENABLING TECHNOLOGY 24 (2003), available at http://www.
smartcardalliance.org/resources/lib/Privacy_White_Paper.pdf (“The Health Passport Project 
(HPP) is an initiative sponsored by the Western Governors’ Association (WGA), with pilot 
implementation conducted in Bismarck, North Dakota, Cheyenne, Wyoming, and Reno, 
Nevada. The project was originally designed to provide a secure, versatile, multi-purpose 
electronic card to streamline access to and delivery of a variety of public and private services 
and benefits.”). 
 174. See infra Table 4. 
 175. For further discussion of logical access controls, see, for example, Jeff Nigriny, 
Integrating Physical and Logical Access Control, ENTER. SYS. (Mar. 22, 2011), http://
esj.com/Articles/2011/03/22/Integrating-Access-Control.aspx; Logical Access Control 
Biometrics, FINDBIOMETRICS, http://findbiometrics.com/applications/logical-access-
control/. 
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Table 4. Examples of ID Cards and Logical Access Restriction 
Program Entity/Country Description 
PIV card swiped for 
computer access 
DOJ Smart card keyboards 
require PIV card for logical 
access to computer.176 
HP Smart Card 
Keyboard 
HP Used to prevent 
unauthorized access to 
computers and networks; 
compatible with the DoD 
Common Access Card 
(CAC).177 
ID card required to 
access the Internet 
China Citizens present ID cards 
when contracting for 




This logical access restriction, if implemented on a national scale, would likely 
require ID verification before an individual is allowed to access certain information 
technologies. It would, of course, also create a record of an individual’s use of 
those same technologies. Given that smart cards are achieving widespread use 
internationally, therefore, they may serve as a potential prototype for a digitalized 
biometric national ID. 
Table 5 demonstrates that the federal government is increasingly integrating 
smart card technology into government-issued ID cards, including U.S. passports. 
Table 5. Examples of Federal “Smart Card” Systems 
Entity “Smart Card”
Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM)
HSPD-12 PIV (Personal 
Identity Verification) Card179
U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) 
Common Access Card180
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE PERSONAL IDENTITY 
VERIFICATION (PIV) CARD SYSTEM (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/
pia-pivcard-hspd12.pdf. 
 177. See Quick Specs: HP USB Smart Card Keyboard, HEWLETT-PACKARD, http://
h18000.www1.hp.com/products/quickspecs/archives_Canada/12346_ca_v4/12346_ca.pdf. 
 178. China Considers Requiring Real Names, Government ID Cards, To Sign Up for 
Internet Access, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 26, 2012, 9:08 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/world/china-require-real-internet-access-article-1.1227414; China To Require ID for 
Internet Access, LAPRENSASA.COM (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.laprensasa.com/309_
america-in-english/1873222_china-to-require-id-for-internet-access.html. 
 179. HSPD-12, supra note 153. 
 180. Common Access Card (CAC), DOD ID CARD REFERENCE CTR., http://www.
cac.mil/common-access-card/. 
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FRAC (First Responder 
Authentication Credential) 182 
DoS e-Passport183
II. PROPOSALS FOR A BIOMETRIC NATIONAL ID SYSTEM 
Multiple policy proposals since 9/11 have contemplated the national adoption of 
a digitalized biometric ID system.184 The growing prevalence of a universal 
biometric data collection mandate is now reflected in recent comprehensive 
immigration reform proposals, including the 2013 Bipartisan Senate 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill. 
A. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Proposals 
In two recent comprehensive immigration reform proposals185 introduced by a 
slate of bipartisan Senators on January 28, 2013,186 and by President Obama on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. Program Information, supra note 163. 
 182. First Responder Authentication Credentials, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://
www.dhs.gov/first-responder-authentication-credentials. 
 183. The U.S. Electronic Passport, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/passport/
passport_2498.html. 
 184. For example, the Real Enforcement with Practical Answers for Immigration Reform 
(REPAIR) Proposal was released on April 29, 2010, by the Offices of Senators Reid (D-
NV), Schumer (D-NY), Menendez (D-NJ), Leahy (D-VT), Durbin (D-IL), and Feinstein (D-
CA). DICK DURBIN, DIANNE FEINSTEIN, PATRICK LEAHY, BOB MENENDEZ, HARRY REID & 
CHUCK SCHUMER, REAL ENFORCEMENT WITH PRACTICAL ANSWERS FOR IMMIGRATION 
REFORM (REPAIR) PROPOSAL (2010) [hereinafter REPAIR], available at http://thehill.com/
images/stories/news/2010/PDFs/immigration2.pdf. Ten pages of the 26-page-long proposal 
discuss the use of a biometric employment verification system in a section entitled, Ending 
Illegal Employment through Biometric Employment Verification. Proponents of the 
immigration reform plan claimed that the Biometric Employment Verification system would 
utilize a “high-tech” Social Security Card. Proponents have denied that such a card is a 
biometric national ID card. Senator Schumer and Senator Graham, for example, have 
implied that a “high-tech” Social Security Card would not be a national ID card because 
“[e]ach card’s unique biometric identifier would be stored only on the card; no government 
database would house everyone’s information. The cards would not contain any private 
information, medical information or tracking devices. The card would be a high-tech version 
of the Social Security card that citizens already have.” Schumer & Graham, supra note 38; 
see also FROOMKIN & WEINBERG, supra note 3. 
 185. A leaked copy of proposed legislation drafted by the White House was reported in 
the media on February 17, 2013. See Alan Gomez, White House Immigration Plan Offers 
Path to Residency, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 2013, 10:06 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
news/nation/2013/02/16/obama-immigration-bill/1925017/. 
 186. Julia Preston, Senators Offer a Bipartisan Blueprint for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/politics/senators-
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January 29, 2013,187 it was agreed that the proposed legislation required the 
implementation of a more expansive digitalized national ID system. The Obama 
White House Proposal calls for a “fraud-resistant, tamper-resistant Social Security 
card” (i.e., a “high-tech Social Security Card”).188 The Bipartisan Senate 
Immigration Plan calls for “an effective employment verification 
system . . . through non-forgeable electronic means prior to obtaining 
employment,”189 most likely the mandatory national expansion of E-Verify and/or a 
biometric-based E-Verify system.190 Past legislative proposals recommending the 
national, mandatory expansion of E-Verify through the New Employee Verification 
Act,191 for example, have recommended the development of a “high-tech Social 
Security Card” or a digitalized, biometric-driven method for identity verification 
pursuant to the E-Verify identity database screening system.192 
More recently, on April 16, 2013, the U.S. Senate formally introduced the 
Bipartisan Senate Immigration Plan, entitled Border Security, Economic 
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.193 This bill allocates $1 billion 
to the Social Security Administration to develop “fraud-resistant, tamper-resistant, 
                                                                                                                 
agree-on-blueprint-for-immigration.html; Ashley Parker, Senators Call Their Bipartisan 
Immigration Plan a ‘Breakthrough,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/01/29/us/politics/senators-unveil-bipartisan-immigration-principles.html. The text of 
the 2013 Bipartisan Immigration Plan is available at http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2013/01/23/us/politics/28immigration-principles-document.html. 
 187. Ezra Klein, READ: President Obama’s Immigration Proposal, WASH. POST 
WONKBLOG (Jan. 29, 2013, 3:00 PM), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/29/read-president-obamas-immigration-proposal/. The text of 
the White House 2013 Immigration Proposal is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration-system-so-everyone-plays
-rules. 
 188. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, FACT SHEET: Fixing Our Broken 
Immigration System So Everyone Plays by the Rules (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/29/fact-sheet-fixing-our-broken-immigration
-system-so-everyone-plays-rules. 
 189. CHARLES SCHUMER, JOHN MCCAIN, DICK DURBIN, LINDSEY GRAHAM, ROBERT 
MENENDEZ, MARCO RUBIO, MICHAEL BENNET & JEFF FLAKE, BIPARTISAN FRAMEWORK FOR 
COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM 4 (2013), available at http://www.c-
span.org/uploadedFiles/Content/Documents/Bipartisan-Framework-For-Immigration-
Reform.pdf. Both the 2013 Bipartisan Immigration Plan proposed by the Senate and the 
2013 White House Immigration Proposal recommend the implementation of an electronic 
employment verification system. See Press Release, supra note 188. 
 190. See SCHUMER ET AL., supra note 189, at 4; infra notes 192, 196, 198. 
 191. H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 192. See id.; Lora L. Ries, B-Verify: Transforming E-Verify into a Biometric Employment 
Verification System, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 271 (2010) (discussing “congressional 
commitment to E-Verify, including added improvements to the program, while Congress and 
[DHS] design the next generation of E-Verify, adding biometrics to the program”); see also 
Schumer & Graham, supra note 38. 
 193. S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
113s744is/pdf/BILLS-113s744is.pdf (introduced on April 16, 2013) (Senators Charles 
Schumer (D-N.Y.), John McCain (R-Ariz.), Richard Durbin (D-Ill.), Lindsey Graham (R-
S.C.), Robert Menendez (D-N.J.), Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Jeff 
Flake (R-Ariz.)). 
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wear-resistant, and identity theft-resistant social security cards.”194 The bill also 
requires the Secretary of DHS to explore the development of biometric-based IDs. 
Specifically, the bill states that “[n]ot later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act” DHS must “submit a report to Congress on the feasibility, 
advantages, and disadvantages of including, in addition to a [digital] photograph, 
other biometric information on each employment authorization document issued by 
the Department.”195 
The bipartisan Senate bill further mandates the national expansion of 
E-Verify.196 If the bill passes, under this E-Verify mandate, all employers, or nearly 
all employers, in the United States will be required to collect the personally 
identifiable data on all new employees (e.g., name, date of birth, and Social 
Security Number) and run this information over the Internet through government 
databases, in order to “verify” the employee’s identity.197 The bill also prescribes 
the creation of a universal, national digitalized photo database and, based upon this 
database, requires all employers to perform a primitive form of biometric analysis. 
E-Verify will require that all employers must inspect a digital photo, uploaded onto 
the Internet by the government through the E-Verify “Photo Tool,” and compare 
the digital photo with the face of the individual seeking employment.198 
                                                                                                                 
 
 194. Id. § 3102(a)(1)–(3), at 504–05. 
 195. Id. § 3103, at 509–10. 
 196. See id. § 3101(a), at 419 (amending language of Section 274A of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), entitled Unlawful Employment of Aliens, to include 
establishment and implementation of an “Employment Verification System”). E-Verify was 
originally authorized as a “Basic Pilot Program” under the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, and its continuation as a test pilot program was 
subject to congressional reauthorization. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 401, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 
3009-655 to 3009-656 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a); see also History and Milestones, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=84979589cdb76210VgnVCM1
00000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=84979589cdb76210VgnVCM100000b92ca60aRCR
D. Thus, the repeal of the original authorization allows for the implementation of a 
mandatory and permanent E-Verify program. See S. 744, § 3101(a), at 503–04. 
 197. See id. The proposed legislation refers to the “System” and does not state explicitly 
that the system is E-Verify. However, the current digitalized “Employment Verification 
System” operated by DHS is E-Verify. The bill does not explain the specific mechanics of 
E-Verify in any detail, yet, does specify that “[t]he employer shall obtain from the individual 
(and the individual shall provide) and shall record in such manner as the Secretary may 
specify—(I) the individual’s social security account number . . . [and] (III) such other 
information as the [DHS] Secretary may require to determine the identity and employment 
authorization of an individual.” Id. at 429–30. 
 198. See id. at 412–13. The proposed legislation does not explain the specific details of 
how the E-Verify Photo Tool will work or how DHS will create a universal digitalized photo 
database of all prospective employees whose identities will be verified under the System. 
However, the bill seems to suggest that DHS intends to utilize digitalized driver’s license 
photos from DMV photo databases, and other photo databases that may be maintained by 
state and local governments. Id. at 412 (requiring all states “to provide the [DHS] Secretary, 
for purposes of identity verification in the [E-Verify] System, with photographs and 
appropriate identifying information maintained by the State”). Next, the bill appears to 
require the development of a new USCIS database within DHS that incorporates state 
1512 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1475 
 
If passed, the long-term implications of the bill on biometric data collection and 
biometric ID cybersurveillance and mass biometric dataveillance are likely to be 
significant. The bill does not indicate whether and which biometric identifiers will 
be included in the “high-tech” Social Security Card that the Social Security 
Administration has been tasked with implementing. The bill also does not indicate 
whether the E-Verify Photo Tool will utilize facial recognition technology. 
However, the Photo Tool likely necessitates the creation of a national digital photo 
database (a biometric database) for identification purposes (biometric database 
screening). Eventually, the “high-tech” Social Security Card and the E-Verify 
Photo Tool, or other technological evolutions of E-Verify that move towards 
biometric enhancements, will likely utilize some type of technological protocol that 
automates identification processes through biometric database screening and data 
matching technologies. 
This comprehensive immigration reform proposal significantly increases the 
likelihood that a universal biometric database would need to be created. A universal 
digitalized biometric ID system would support the identity management systems 
already existing and that are expanded by the bill, as well as the new identity 
management programs and biometric ID enhancements that are proposed under the 
bill. In particular, the bill incorporates multiple provisions that include a dramatic 
expansion of both biometric data collection protocols and biometric database 
screening protocols.  
Table 6 summarizes some of the ways in which the most recent comprehensive 
immigration reform bill emphasizes biometric data collection and screening as a 
significant component of immigration reform and border security policy. 
Table 6. Examples of Biometric-Centered Provisions in the 2013 Bipartisan Senate 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill: Border Security, Economic Opportunity, 
and Immigration Modernization Act (introduced April 16, 2013) 
Title and Section  Section Name Description 




Revises Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 (INA) to include Section 
245B, which sets up various 
requirements for granting registered 
provisional status and proposes to 
include a subsection on “Security 
and Law Enforcement Clearances” 
for registered provisional 
immigrants.201 Sets forth requirement 
                                                                                                                 
biometric data (digitalized photos) and biographical data to facilitate E-Verify database 
screening. Id. at 413. Specifically, the bill directs the DHS Secretary to “develop and 
maintain a photo tool that enables employers to match the photo on a covered identity 
document provided to the employer to a photo maintained by a U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services database.” Id. 
 199. Id. § 2101, at 59–93. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. § 2101(a), at 78–79. 
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to submit biometric and biographic 
data and pass background check.202 
Title II, Section 
2102203 




Revises INA to include Section 245C 
that establishes an application fee to 
cover processing costs, including 
cost of biometric and biographic data 
collection.205  
Title II, Section 
2103206 
The DREAM Act207 Revises INA to include Section 
245D, setting forth requirement to 
submit biometric and biographic data 
and pass background check.208 
Title II, Section 
2211209 
Requirements for Blue 
Card Status210  
Sets forth requirement for biometric 
and biographic data collection,211 
assessment of processing fee “to take 
and process biometrics,”212 and 
denial of the application for failure to 
submit “requested biometric data.”213 





Sets forth requirement that 
application fee will cover “the cost 
of taking and processing 
biometrics.”216  





Amends Section 274A of the INA to 
include establishment and 
implementation of an “Employment 
Verification System” (e.g., 
mandating national implementation 
of E-Verify),219 including mandatory 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. Id. at 78–85. 
 203. Id. § 2102, at 94–110. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. § 2102(a), at 94, 106. 
 206. Id. § 2103, at 110–17. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. § 2103(b), at 110, 113–14. 
 209. Id. § 2211, at 153–74. 
 210. Id. § 2211. “Blue Card Status” may be granted to an alien who “performed 
agricultural employment in the United States for not fewer than 575 hours or 100 work days 
during the 2-year period ending on December 31, 2010,” and to such alien’s spouse or child. 
Id. § 2211(a), at 153. 
 211. Id. § 2211(b)(6)(A), at 162. 
 212. Id. § 2211(b)(8)(A)(ii)(II), at 164. 
 213. Id. § 2211(b)(9)(A)(i), at 166. 
 214. Id. § 2212, at 174–84. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. § 2212(e)(2)(A)(i), at 179. 
 217. Id. § 3101, at 395–504. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. § 3101(a), at 395, 419–504. 
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implementation of a “Photo Tool” 
(i.e., mandating the national 
expansion of digitalized photo 
database under the E-Verify “Photo 
Tool”).220 
Title III, Section 
3102221 
Increasing Security 
and Integrity of Social 
Security Cards222 
Sets forth SSA’s allocation of $1 
billion to implement new Social 
Security Card,223 and amends the 
Social Security Act to insert the 
following language: “‘The social 
security card shall be fraud-resistant, 
tamper-resistant, wear-resistant, and 
identity theft-resistant.’”224  
Title III, Section 
3103225 
Increasing Security 
and Integrity of 
Immigration 
Documents226 
Section 3103 states: “Not later than 1 
year after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the [DHS] Secretary shall 
submit a report to Congress on the 
feasibility, advantages, and 
disadvantages of including, in 
addition to a photograph, other 
biometric information on each 
employment authorization document 
issued by the Department.”227 





Passengers, Crew, and 
Non-Crew Onboard 
Departing Aircraft and 
Vessels229 
Requires “biometric departure 
information” to be collected: 
“Carriers boarding alien passengers, 
crew, and non-crew subject to the 
requirement to provide information 
upon departure US-VISIT processing 
shall collect identity-theft resistant 
departure manifest information from 
each alien at a collection location at 
the airport or seaport before boarding 
                                                                                                                 
 
 220. Id. at 413–15. 
 221. Id. § 3102, at 504–09. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. § 3102(a)(1)–(3), at 504–05.The proposed legislation does not use the words 
“high-tech” Social Security Card; however, as discussed above, previous discussions on the 
need to improve the Social Security Card have described such enhancements as “high-tech.” 
 224. Id. § 3102(a)(2), at 505. 
 225. Id. § 3103, at 509–10. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. § 3304, at 543–48. 
 229. Id. 
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that alien on transportation for 
departure from the United States.”230 
Delegates to DHS Secretary 
determination of the appropriate 
method “to ensure the adequate 
collection and transmission of 
biometric departure manifest 
information.”231 
Title III, Section 
3711232 
Inadmissible Aliens233 Sets forth new ground for 
inadmissibility to include the failure 
to comply with biometric data 
collection request.234 




Worker Mobility236  
References “review of all standard 
database and biometric checks” in 
context of granting State Department 
ability to grant “Interview Waivers 
for Low Risk Visa Applicants.”237 
 
To understand part of the reason why the current immigration reform bill 
emphasizes the need for dramatically expanded biometric data collection and 
biometric database screening programs and protocols, it is useful to consider the 
current bill’s predecessors. One recent predecessor, for example, was titled the 
Biometric Enrollment, Locally-stored Information, and Electronic Verification of 
Employment (BELIEVE) proposal, and was introduced in 2010.238 The BELIEVE 
proposal was unlike other biometric ID data collection programs that have been 
previously implemented—such as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 
(HSPD-12), United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT), and the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005—which limited the collection of 
biometric data to discrete subsets of the U.S. population. In contrast, recent 
immigration reform and identity management proposals, such as BELIEVE and the 
2013 Bipartisan Senate Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill, recommend a 
universal or near-universal collection of biometric data—such as digital photos, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 230. Id. § 3304(b)(3), at 544–45. 
 231. Id. § 3304(e), at 547. 
 232. Id. § 3711, at 633–38. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. § 3711(b)(1), at 634. 
 235. Id. § 4103, at 664–67. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. § 4103(d), at 666–67. 
 238. See REPAIR, supra note 184, at 11–18; see also Ezra Klein, Is a Biometric, 
National ID Card an Immigration Game Changer?, WASH. POST.COM (Apr. 30, 2010, 10:45 
AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/04/is_a_biometric_national_id_
car.html; FROOMKIN & WEINBERG, supra note 3; Schumer & Graham, supra note 38, (“We 
would require all U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who want jobs to obtain a high-tech, 
fraud-proof Social Security Card. Each card’s unique biometric identifier would be stored 
only on the card . . . .”). 
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scanned fingerprints and irises, and/or DNA—from every U.S. citizen and 
noncitizen currently residing in the United States,239 over 300 million men, women, 
and children, according to the U.S. Census.240 
In BELIEVE, for example, Congress recommended replacing the paper-based 
Social Security Card with a digitalized national biometric ID,241 also referred to as 
a “high-tech, fraud-proof Social Security Card.”242 The BELIEVE immigration 
reform proposal recommended collecting and including biometric data and other 
personally identifiable data on a machine-readable card.243 Policymakers explained 
that the “high-tech Social Security Card” would operate similarly to a credit card in 
a machine-swipe capacity.244 Unclear in the BELIEVE proposal was whether such 
a “high-tech” Social Security Card would include a geolocational tracking device. 
The surveillance capacity of a device that resembles a credit card is significant in 
part because “there is now a [GPS] device in use that weighs two ounces and is the 
size of a credit card.”245 Therefore, geolocational tracking through a “high-tech” 
Social Security Card that resembles a credit card could be made possible through 
GPS, RFID, or a combination of GPS-RFID technologies.246  
Calls for a national biometric ID have also been made in connection with state 
immigration reform efforts such as those passed in Arizona. For example, 
immediately after passage of the highly controversial Arizona Senate Bill 1070 
(SB 1070), one member of Congress declared on national television, “I’m ready to 
give a little blood and a little DNA to prove that I’m legally working in the United 
States of America,” protesting both Arizona’s presumptive racial profiling mandate 
and the current “broken” immigration system.247 The congressman elaborated that a 
biometric-based, high-tech Social Security Card was essential to fixing the 
immigration system. Moreover, the “architect of Arizona immigration law 
SB 1070”248 has argued that biometric passports are necessary to “secure the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. See, e.g., Danny Yadron, Senators in Immigration Talks Mull Federal IDs for All 
Workers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2013, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323864304578316434045924350.html (“Key senators are exploring an 
immigration bill that would force every U.S. worker—citizen or not—to carry a high-tech 
identity card that could use fingerprints or other personal markers to prove a person’s legal 
eligibility to work.”). 
 240. U.S. & World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at http://www.
census.gov/popclock/ (as of May 6, 2013, the U.S. Census reports 315,808,633 in the U.S. 
population). 
 241. See Schumer & Graham, supra note 38. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See id.; see also REPAIR, supra note 184, at 8–11. 
 244. Schumer & Graham, supra note 38 (“Prospective employers would be responsible 
for swiping the cards through a machine to confirm a person's identity and immigration 
status.”). 
 245. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 n.1 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 246. See supra note 150. 
 247. Lynn Sweet, Gutierrez Arrested for Immigration Protest; Explains on CBS “Face 
the Nation,” CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 2, 2010, 8:19 PM), http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/
2010/05/gutierrez_arrested_for_immigra.html (transcribing a Face the Nation interview with 
Congressman Luis Gutierrez (D-Ill.)). 
 248. John Hanna, Kris Kobach, Architect of Arizona Immigration Law SB1070, Is Behind 
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border” and verify the identity of those in the U.S. who may be potential 
terrorists.249 Consequently, both opponents and proponents of Arizona SB 1070 
have called for the implementation of a digitalized biometric ID for immigration 
reform purposes. 
Further, although proponents of such a measure contend that a “high-tech” 
Social Security Card is not a “Biometric National ID Card,”250 experts have already 
concluded that such a “high-tech” card or cardless system such as E-Verify would 
function as a national ID251 given that the Social Security Number has transformed 
from its original intended function.252 Although established in the 1930s as a 
government-assigned number intended to facilitate the transmission of a federal 
retirement benefit, experts have observed that the Social Security Number has 
morphed into a universal de facto national ID number.253 
Currently, the Social Security Number provides an essential universal data 
“backbone identification tool” for many identity management programs and 
database screening systems. E-Verify and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 
database screening protocols, for example, rely upon this data backbone.254 Identity 
management technologies such as E-Verify and HAVA both depend on the Social 
Security Number to determine whether there is a “match” between the person 
presenting the data and the preexisting Social Security Administration (SSA) 
database.255 The statistical algorithms of the E-Verify software program necessitate, 
                                                                                                                 
Other Controversial Laws (May 10, 2010, 5:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
05/10/kris-kobach-architect-of_n_570662.html. 
 249. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform in 2009, Can We Do It and How?: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Sec. and Refugees of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 34 (2009) [hereinafter Comprehensive Immigration Reform 2009 
Hearings] (testimony of Kris W. Kobach, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. (Kan. City) Sch. of 
Law), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/09-04-30Kobach
Testimony.pdf. 
 250. See Schumer & Graham, supra note 38. 
 251. Harper, supra note 26. Former Congressman Bob Barr (R-GA) observes that 
E-Verify functionally operates as a “stealth” national ID system under the definition set forth 
by Jim Harper. See Bob Barr, “E-Verify” Is a Stealth National ID, THE BARR CODE (June 
10, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://blogs.ajc.com/bob-barr-blog/2011/06/10/e-verify-is-a-stealth-
national-id/; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
REAL ID ACT 5 (2007) [hereinafter REAL ID PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_realid.pdf (“An argument exists that 
both the SSN and existing state credentials already create de facto national identifiers.”). 
 252. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW: FEW BENEFITS, 
STAGGERING COSTS 1–3 (2008), available at http://epic.org/privacy/id_cards/epic_realid_
0508.pdf. 
 253. See id. 
 254. Cate, supra note 34, at 469 (describing the Social Security Administration’s 
NUMIDENT database as the “backbone identification verification tool for social service and 
other federal programs”). HAVA mandates states to conduct database screening on the 
driver’s license number or the last four digits of the Social Security Number to authenticate 
the identity of newly registered voters. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i)(I)−(II) (2006). 
 255. See E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27–
28 (2011) (written testimony of Theresa C. Bertucci, Associate Director, Enterprise Services 
Directorate, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services); Carolyn Puckett, Office of 
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therefore, the collection of an employee’s Social Security Number, if such a 
number exists. 
As a de facto national ID number,256 the Social Security Number is used to track 
and screen data on individuals for multiple purposes.257 But the susceptibility of the 
Social Security Number to fraudulent misuse is precisely why policymakers are 
now looking to biometric data. In recent years, both public and private sector 
leaders have expressed concern that the Social Security Number is not reliable 
enough as a data “backbone” to support identity management systems.258 In short, 
there are too many anomalous results from the Social Security Number database 
and the identity verification matching technologies that rely upon a Social Security 
Number as a data backbone. The statistical algorithms needed to support identity 
verification thus require more and more additional personally identifiable data to 
increase the reliability that an individual is a true “match” in the database screening 
process by comparing present data with preexisting database information.259 
Consequently, policy experts are calling for multimodal biometric identification 
systems (a combination of facial recognition, fingerprints, iris scans, and DNA, for 
instance) to serve as the new data backbone to increase the reliability of identity 
screening systems.260  
                                                                                                                 
Retirement and Disability Policy, The Story of the Social Security Number, 69 SOC. SEC. 
BULL., no. 2, 2009, at 55, 69–70. 
 256. REAL ID PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 251, at 5 (noting that the Social 
Security Number has become a “de facto” national identification number, and that “it is yet 
unclear whether a REAL ID compliant driver’s license or identification card will become 
any more of a national ID than the Social Security Number (SSN) or existing state-issued 
driver's licenses and identification cards.”). 
 257. Id. at 6 (“Thus, for example, if retailers, healthcare providers, financial institutions, 
insurers, and other private or government entities were to collect the credential and record 
the ID number whenever individuals engaged in a transaction, the REAL ID’s unique 
number could pose the same, if not greater, risks as experienced in the use of the SSN.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 258. Cate, supra note 34, at 469 (observing that the error rate of SSA’s NUMIDENT 
database was found to be 4.1%—in other words, 17.8 million records “contained 
‘discrepancies in the name, date of birth or citizenship status of the numberholder’ or 
concerned deceased individuals” (quoting Office of Inspector Gen., Soc. Sec. Admin., 
Congressional Response Report: Accuracy of the Social Security Administration’s 
NUMIDENT File (A-08-06-26100), at ii (2006))). 
 259. Identity management programs such as E-Verify rely upon algorithmic data 
matching technologies. See, e.g., GAO EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION, supra note 109. Like 
many new identity management systems that rely upon statistical algorithms, these data-
driven systems and big data are “about applying math to huge quantities of data in order to 
infer probabilities . . . . The key is that these systems perform well because they are fed with 
lots of data on which to base their predictions.” MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 
31, at 11–12. 
 260. See, e.g., LYNCH, supra note 3, at 10 (“Traditionally, biometrics databases such as 
IAFIS and IDENT have collected only one biometric at a time [e.g., fingerprints]. However, 
the government has argued these ‘unimodal’ systems are limited and has been pushing to 
develop ‘multimodal’ systems that collect and combine two or more biometrics (for 
example, photographs and fingerprints). The government argues that collecting multiple 
biometrics from each subject will make identification systems more accurate.” (footnotes 
omitted)); see also GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 58; Janice Kephart, 
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Once implemented, a more comprehensively invasive biometric-based universal 
data backbone (rather than Social Security Number-based data backbone) could be 
utilized to analyze data on any given individual through data mining and profiling. 
Already, government and government-contracted data aggregation systems analyze 
data from publicly available databases and private data and databases. “Much of the 
data is collected from electronic surveillance and documents obtained by 
government agencies or in collaboration with commercial sources.”261 These 
commercial and government sources can be aggregated to develop “transactional 
history [that] shows employment status, credit history, use of government services, 
travel patterns, financial transactions, and consumer habits that when combined 
depict the person’s identity and overall activities.”262 
Currently, in addition to an individual’s name, one’s birthdate, Social Security 
Number, and other numbers (driver’s license, passport, etc.) are used to facilitate 
this type of database sorting. Adding biometric data enhancements to a numerical 
data backbone, such as the Social Security Number, risks even greater government 
intrusiveness because of the sensitive information that can be gleaned from an 
individual’s DNA (genetic disorders, behavioral genetic profiling, religious and 
ethnic heritage, etc.) as well as information that can be analyzed from other 
biometric data, such as information yielded by a digital photo (demographic 
information such as race and color as well as digitalized facial analytical 
profiling).263 
B. Portability of Biometric Screeners and Mobile Biometric Sensors 
The feasibility of utilizing biometric data as a form of mass identification, rather 
than relying upon an identifier such as the Social Security Number, has been 
greatly enhanced by the emerging development of portable, noninvasive biometric 
screeners (e.g., devices that can collect and screen biometric data through 
databases) and mobile biometric sensors (e.g., devices that can capture and enroll 
biometric data in biometric databases). Policy trends in recent years have 
                                                                                                                 
Border Watchlisting a Decade After 9/11, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUD. (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.cis.org/border-watchlisting-9-11 (“To ensure a more accurate watchlist, 
biometrics, including digitized facial images and fingerprints, need to be fully incorporated 
into watchlisting.”); Written Testimony of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Border 
Patrol Chief Michael Fisher, Office of Field Operations Assistant Commissioner Kevin 
McAleenan, and Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition Assistant Commissioner 
Mark Borkowski for a House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border 
and Maritime Security: “Measuring the Outcomes To Understand the State of Border 
Security,” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Measuring the 
Outcomes], http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/03/20/written-testimony-cbp-house-homeland-
security-subcommittee-border-and-maritime; Simone Wilson, FBI Documents Reveal ICE’s 
‘Secure Communities’ Program Was Mandated To Further FBI’s Own Creepy Biometric 
Database, LA WEEKLY BLOGS (Jul. 6, 2011, 9:30 AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/
informer/2011/07/fbi_documents_ice_secure_communities_program_mandated_biometric_
database.php. 
 261. BLOSS, supra note 92, at 181. 
 262. Id. See generally GARFINKEL, supra note 3; O’HARROW, supra note 3; PRIEST & 
ARKIN, supra note 13. 
 263. See generally TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS (2003). 
1520 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1475 
 
increasingly emphasized the need for portable and handheld biometric screeners 
and mobile biometric sensors. These newly developed technologies facilitate the 
ability to use biometric-based data backbones as a method to augment and/or 
replace a Social Security Number-based data backbone. 
Table 7 provides examples of the proliferation of the use of portable biometric 
screeners that allow for the collection and analysis of biometric data in the field. 
Table 7. Examples of Portable and Handheld Biometric Screeners 








such as granting 
asylum, processing 
applications for 
relatives to come to 
the U.S., and 
deterring child 
trafficking and illegal 















(name, gender, date 
of birth, nationality, 
departure point, date 
of departure, 
destination point, and 
identity of the master 
of the U.S. vessel in 
question)” to provide 
biometric analysis 
and collection 








A 3.6 pound unit that 
enrolls biometric data 
“Combin[es] 
forensic-quality 
                                                                                                                 
 
 264. Mickey McCarter, Homeland Security Considering Portable, Instant DNA Scanners, 
FOX NEWS (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/03/04/homeland-security-
considering-portable-instant-dna-scanners/. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Donohue, supra note 3, at 482 (footnote omitted). 
 267. Id. 




into AFIS databases, 
such as DoD ABIS, 
and leverages a 
120,000-person 
watchlist; designed 
for “rugged” use.269 
fingerprint 
capture, rapid dual 










U.S. Army271 Reportedly used for 
border security in 
Afghanistan. “The 
handheld device can 
store up to 22,000 
profiles[.]”272 
Fingerprint scans, 




With a universal biometric database and “cardless” national ID system, such as a 
biometric E-Verify system, or biometric national ID card—e.g., digitalized and 
multimodal biometric driver’s license, Social Security Card, or passport—federal, 
state, and local law enforcement could scan biometric data or request to see a 
digitalized biometric ID for a wide range of reasons, including routine traffic 
stops.274 With a biometric identifier extracted from one’s body—for instance, by 
digitally scanning one’s face, fingerprints, irises; and/or swabbing saliva for DNA 
profiling—law enforcement could run this information against biometric databases 
in an attempt to authenticate or determine identity. Such mass biometric 
dataveillance programs could eventually be used to serve identity inference systems 
and big data cybersurveillance technologies as well. 
                                                                                                                 
 268. CROSSMATCH TECHNOLOGIES, SEEK II (June 25, 2012), available at 
http://www.crossmatch.com/product_assets/brochures/SEEKII.pdf. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Richard Andrade, Troopers Deploy HIIDE System at Border Crossing Point, U.S. 
ARMY (Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.army.mil/article/51768/troopers-deploy-hiide-system-at-
border-crossing-point/. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of state statutes requiring suspects to 
“identify themselves” during police investigations. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court 
of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (holding that law enforcement’s legitimate need to dispel 
suspicion of criminal activity justified requiring self-identification by a suspect during Terry 
stops under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and that the state statute’s 
requirement of self-identification did not violate the Fifth Amendment, however, leaving 
open the potential that providing a name could be self-incriminating and may implicate the 
Fifth Amendment in another factual circumstance); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 
U.S. 873 (1975) (holding that U.S. Border Patrol may stop vehicles near the U.S.-Mexico 
border and query citizenship and immigration status of vehicle occupants who appear to be 
of Mexican national origin, combined with other facts and inferences that raise reasonable 
suspicion regarding legal immigration status of those questioned); see also Kevin R. 
Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1005 (2010). 
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Table 8 indicates that smartphone technology, in particular, is facilitating 
methods by which the public and private sectors can track and verify biometric and 
biographic data simultaneously. 
Table 8. Examples of Smartphones as Mobile Biometric Screeners and Sensors 
Program Entity Description 
Tactivo275 Precise Biometrics Device is a “combination 
smart card and fingerprint 
reader for iPhone 4 and 4S.” 
It is an identity verification 
system that supports the use 
of government credentials, 






BI2 Technologies  Hardware attachment and 
software application for 
smartphones allows police 
officers to identify suspects 
using iris recognition, 
fingerprints, and digital 
photographs.277 Application 
links to a national database 
of criminal records managed 
by BI2 Technologies.278 
eyeD Biometric 
Password Manager 
Winkpass Creations, Inc. Application compatible with 
iPhones uses your iris scan 
as your password for secure 
information.279 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. The federal government ordered Tactivo in August of 2012. Jill Jaracz, U.S. 
Government Orders Tactivo Smart Casings, SECUREIDNEWS (Aug. 7, 2012), 
http://www.secureidnews.com/2012/08/07/u-s-government-orders-tactivo-smart-casings. 
 276. Mobile Device Security with Tactivo, PRECISE BIOMETRICS, http://www.
precisebiometrics.com/tactivo-for-government. Tactivo matches smart card credentials with 
the fingerprint application on the iPhone, acting almost as a handheld E-verify system. See 
id. 
 277. BI2 Technologies MORIS, POPSCI.COM, http://www.popsci.com/bown/2010/product/
b12-technologies-moris. 
 278. Emily Steel, How a New Police Tool for Face Recognition Works, WALL ST. J. 
BLOGS (July 13, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/how-a-new-police-
tool-for-face-recognition-works/. 
 279. eyeD® Biometric Password Manager, ITUNES, https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/eyed-
biometric-password-manager/id389295175?mt=8. 
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C. Government Biometric Databases and Database Screening Programs 
Federal and state governments operate multiple biometric databases and are 
increasingly emphasizing the need to collect biometric data and to screen this data 
through biometric databases. With the ease of a scan by a smartphone (e.g., 
fingerprint and iris scan) and with a card swipe or a tap of a smartphone against 
another smartphone or portable screener, law enforcement could instantly compile 
a “detailed digital dossier”280 from a search of multiple public and private 
databases. Applying the “No-Fly List” practice to a more universal application, law 
enforcement could use an algorithm-based threat risk assessment to justify the 
search and detention of those stopped. Given current trends in DNA-based 
prosecutions, evidence from a database search could potentially lead to arrest and 
conviction based on “cold hit” DNA database evidence alone.281 
Table 9 provides examples of federal and state biometric databases that 
currently store biometric data for identity verification database screening and other 
purposes. 
Table 9. Examples of Government Biometric Database Programs 
Program Entity Description 
Combined DNA Index 
System (CODIS)282 
FBI Federal and state 
combined DNA database 
containing DNA from 
over 10 million profiles, 
collected during ongoing 
state criminal 
investigations.283 
“CODIS software makes 
it possible for local, state 
and federal crime 
laboratories to share and 
compare DNA data.”284 
National DNA Index 
System (NDIS)285 
FBI Federal DNA database286 
                                                                                                                 
 
 280. GARFINKEL, supra note 3, at 70; see also Solove, supra note 21. 
 281. See Roth, supra note 29. 
 282. Authorized by the DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006). 
 283. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/
about-us/lab/codis/ndis-statistics (over 10 million offender profiles as of March 2013, and 
FBI reports that CODIS has produced over 205,700 hits assisting in more than 197,400 
investigations). 
 284. Anna Stolley Persky, An Arresting Development: Courts Split Over DNA Testing for 
Those Merely Charged with a Crime, 98 A.B.A. J. MAG., Jan. 1, 2012, at 15. 
 285. Authorized by the DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006). 
 286. See Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National 
DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/
codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet. 










U.S. Department of Defense 
(DoD) 
To enable military 






DHS Database of digital 







data system across 
federal, state, and 
military operations and 
databases.290
DoD Next Generation 
ABIS 
DoD Designed to identify 
“persons of national 
security interest”291 for 
force protection, 
including “‘operational 





database and Passport 
DoS Worldwide facial 
recognition system run 
by DoS to evaluate visa 
                                                                                                                 
 
 287. See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis. 
 288. See BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REPORT FY07 6 (2007), available at http://
www.biometrics.dod.mil/Files/Documents/AnnualReports/fy07.pdf. 
 289. See IDENT PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 120, at 3. 
 290. See Next Generation Identification, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.
gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi; FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, PRIVACY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 
(IAFIS)/NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION (NGI) BIOMETRIC INTEROPERABILITY (2012), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/iafis-ngi-interoperability-1. 
 291. Donohue, supra note 3, at 452. 
 292. Next Generation ABIS Goes Operational, Now Referred to as DoD ABIS, 
BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Newsletter/issues/2009/Apr/
v5issue2_a1.html (quoting Mark Downs, DoD Abis Operations Mgr. for the Biometrics Task 
Force). 








DoS Data warehouse that 
stores biometric and 
biographic information 
on U.S. citizens, lawful 
permanent residents, and 
foreign nationals to 
screen visa applicants, 
register facial images, 




USCIS  “[C]entralized repository 
of all biometric data 




TECS System (“CBP 




Reports] Initiative”)297  
U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP)298 
Data repository for U.S. 
CBP database screening: 
“TECS is the principal 
system used by officers at 
the border to assist with 
screening and 
determinations regarding 
admissibility of arriving 
persons.”299 
Interstate Photo System FBI Component of NGI that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 293. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: PASSPORT LOOKOUT TRACKING 
SYSTEM (PLOTS) PIA (2012), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
109088.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ABIS) 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1 (2011) [hereinafter ABIS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT], 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/109132.pdf. 
 294. ABIS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 293. 
 295. Donohue, supra note 3, at 435–36. The CCD does not directly collect information 
from individuals and thus does not have to provide notice in accordance with the Privacy 
Act. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD) PRIVACY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) 17 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/93772.pdf. 
 296. Donohue, supra note 3, at 435 (footnote omitted). 
 297. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
TECS SYSTEM: CBP PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESSING (TECS) NATIONAL SAR 
INITIATIVE 2 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy-pia-
cbp-tecs-sar-update.pdf. TECS was formerly known as the Treasury Enforcement 
Communications System. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
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(IPS) incorporates media not 
just from law 
enforcement but from 
private businesses, social 
networking sites, 
government agencies, 
and foreign and 
international entities, as 
well as individuals like 
acquaintances, friends, 
and family members.300 
DNA collection of 
convicted offenders and 
those arrested or 
charged301 
States and the federal 
government302 
Twenty-eight states and 
the Federal government 
authorize the collection 
of DNA from those 
arrested or charged with 
certain qualifying 
offenses.303 
DNA collection from 
juvenile arrestees 
States Thirty states collect DNA 
from juveniles.304 
                                                                                                                 
 
 300. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) 
Interstate Photo System (IPS), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (June 9, 2008), http://www.
fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/interstate-photo-system. The media stored by the 
system includes photographs searchable by using facial recognition technology, as well as 
photographs of scars, distinct marks, and tattoos. See Next Generation Identification, supra 
note 290. 
 301. Thirteen of the twenty-eight states collect DNA from all those arrested for a felony; 
the others limit collection to certain felonies, usually those involving violence or sexual 
assault. Julie Samuels, Elizabeth Davies, Dwight Pope & Ashleigh Holand, Collecting DNA 
from Arrestees: Implementation Lessons, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, no. 270, June 2012, at 18, 
21. Seven states collect from those arrested or charged with misdemeanors. Id. 
 302. “Most states place the responsibility for initiating expungement on the individual 
from whom a sample was collected. States that bear the responsibility for initiating 
expungement include Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Vermont and Virginia.” Id. at 23 (footnote omitted). 
 303. Id. at 19. “The pace of expansion increased dramatically after Congress passed the 
DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, which, among other things, enabled states to upload arrestee 
DNA profiles to the National DNA Index System (NDIS). Between 2006 and 2011, 23 states 
passed arrestee DNA collection legislation.” Id. (footnote omitted). Of the twenty-eight 
states that authorize the collection of DNA from those arrested or charged with certain 
qualifying offenses, only eleven require a judicial determination prior to DNA collection. Id. 
at 20 fig. 1. 
 304. JULIE E. SAMUELS, ALLISON M. DWYER, ROBIN HALBERSTADT & PAMELA LACHMAN, 
URBAN INSTIT. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., COLLECTING DNA FROM JUVENILES iii (2011), available 
at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/417487-Collecting-DNA-from-Juveniles.pdf. But, 
only ten of these states provided “meaningful data on juvenile profiles in state or national 
databases.” Id. at v. Of these ten states, which represented 42% of the total number of 
2013] BIOMETRIC ID CYBERSURVEILLANCE 1527 
 
 
Additionally, a “high-tech” Social Security Card, such as the one promulgated 
under BELIEVE and now contemplated for further exploration by the Social 
Security Administration under the 2013 Bipartisan Senate Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Bill, likely would have a significant impact on existing “stop 
and identify yourself” laws and programs.305 State and local law enforcement 
agencies, in partnership with the federal government, have increasingly 
incorporated elements of database screening technologies, including biometric 
database screening protocols.306 Consequently, the proponents of immigration 
federalism—state and local government efforts to control unwanted migration—
have specifically called for the implementation of a biometric ID.307 A biometric 
national ID card would greatly facilitate the database screening protocols required 
by various dataveillance tools embedded within biometric data screening protocols 
mandated by immigration federalism laws.308 
Table 10 provides examples of identity-verification programs that utilize 
database screening protocols as a method of immigration and crime control 
enforcement. 
Table 10. Examples of Immigration-Related Biometric Screening Programs 
Program Entity Description 
Secure Communities (S-
COMM) 






screening of anyone 
apprehended by state and 
local law enforcement 
through DHS and FBI 
databases.309
Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP) 
ICE/FBI Cooperating state and 
local jails, prisons, and 
detention facilities allow 
federal immigration 
agents to conduct 
                                                                                                                 
profiles uploaded to CODIS that collect juvenile DNA, “juvenile profiles accounted for six 
percent of all DNA profiles submitted.” Id. 
 305. See, e.g., Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) 
(holding that state “stop and identify” statutes do not violate Fourth Amendment). 
 306. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 460–61; RANDY CAPPS, MARC R. ROSENBLUM, 
CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, MIGRATION POLICY INST., DELEGATION AND 
DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 17 (2011); 
supra Part I.B.2; infra note 332. 
 307. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform 2009 Hearings, supra note 249, at 34 
(testimony of Kris W. Kobach, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mo. (Kan. City) Sch. of Law); see 
also Hanna, supra note 248 (describing Kobach as the “architect” of Arizona’s immigration 
law, SB 1070). 
 308. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 13, at 596–604. 
 309. See Secure Communities, supra note 131. 




screening onsite through 





FBI FBI criminal database 








USCIS Requires biometric data 
collection from all 
noncitizen visitors to the 
United States.312 
III. DIGITALIZED BIOMETRIC DATA AND BIOMETRIC DATA MATCHING 
Proponents of a biometric national ID champion the creation of a national 
identification credentialing database, supported by the development of a universal 
data backbone based upon traditionally gathered personally identifiable 
information, as well as newly acquired biometric data.313 Moreover, the multiplicity 
of identity management programs, often requiring the collection of varying 
personally identifiable information, creates unifying pressure to develop a single 
universal data backbone.314 Given this, it is important to understand the mechanics 
of biometric data collection and matching. It is equally important to understand the 
problems and concerns that have been raised about biometric identification 
management systems. 
A. Biometric Data Collection 
Biometric IDs and the surveillance they enable require as an initial matter the 
collection of biometric data from individuals. Biometric data is alluring for security 
purposes because it appears forgery resistant insofar as the data comes from one’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 310. See Fact Sheet: Criminal Alien Program (CAP), U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/cap.htm. 
 311. See National Crime Information Center, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.
fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic. NCIC database is used for multiple purposes and is accessible by 
law enforcement agencies nationwisde. Id. 
 312. See Fact Sheet: US-VISIT Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT (May 19, 2003), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/us-visit.htm. 
 313. See, e.g., Jim Harper, Schumer and Graham on Immigration Reform: Why Not Do It 
Without the Biometric National ID?, CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (Mar. 19, 2010, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.cato.org/blog/schumer-graham-immigration-reform-why-not-do-it-without-bio
metric-national-id (arguing that although Schumer and Graham claim that their proposal for 
a biometric national ID would not include a government database, that is the natural result of 
their plan). 
 314. Id. 
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own body. As discussed above, digitalized biometric data is currently defined as 
information that provides a unique technological identifier based on an 
individualized characteristic of one’s body.315 Biometric data currently can be 
pulled, for example, from fingerprint and iris scans, DNA, skeletal bone imaging, 
facial recognition software through digital photographs, and voice recognition 
software through voice recordings.316 
In Tables 11 through 13, I provide common examples of various biometric data 
harvesting programs: DNA data collection, fingerprint data collection, and 
digitalized facial recognition data collection. As the tables make clear, the 
harvesting of bodily data is already widespread and routine, even as it is also 
evolving and expanding in terms of the kinds of government programs that 
mandate it. Those suspected of criminal or otherwise unlawful presence in the 
country are currently targeted by government biometric data harvesting 
programs.317 However, I also include private ID programs below to show that the 
surrender of such data is becoming normalized by, for example, amusement parks, 
banks, and health clubs. 
Table 11. Examples of DNA Data Harvesting Programs 
Program Entity Description 
DNA Analysis Backlog 
Elimination Act of 
2000318 
FBI Compels production of 
DNA samples from 
parolees of qualifying 
federal offenses.319 
Katie Sepich Enhanced 
DNA Collection Act of 
2010320 
FBI Compilation of national 
DNA databases taken 
from people arrested of 
crimes (does not require 
conviction for DNA data 
harvesting).321
                                                                                                                 
 
 315. BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 1–4. 
 316. See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 3; BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 31–34. 
 317. See, e.g., Secure Communities, supra note 131; Fact Sheet: US-VISIT Program, 
supra note 312. 
 318. Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
14135–14135e (2006); 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2006)). 
 319. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(2). 
 320. H.R. 4614, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 321. Id. 
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“Juli’s Law”322 and other 
state DNA harvesting 
laws.323 
Under many of the state 
laws requiring DNA 
harvesting, DNA saliva 
swabbing kits are 
provided to state prisons 
and local jails where 
samples are collected.324 
The information gathered 
often includes offenders’ 
names, Social Security 
Numbers, birth dates, 




DNA collection of those 
detained for felony and 
misdemeanor offenses of 
assault and battery, 
domestic abuse, stalking, 
possession of a controlled 
dangerous substance, 
outraging public decency, 
resisting arrest, and 
peeping Tom.326 Some 
state laws require the 
collection of DNA from 
those suspected of 
unlawful presence.327 
                                                                                                                 
 
 322. S.B. 1102, 52nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009) (named after Juli Busken, a 
University of Oklahoma student murdered in 1996). State lawmakers contend the expansion 
of DNA harvesting at the state level can bring “cold case” criminals to justice through “cold 
hit” DNA evidence. See, e.g., Okla. State Senate Commc’n Div., Gov. Signs Julie’s [sic] 
Law (May 20, 2009), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press_releases/press_releases_2009/
pr20090520g.html. 
 323. Persky, supra note 284, at 15 (“According to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures, all 50 states require that convicted sex offenders provide DNA samples. 
Increasingly, according to the conference, states are expanding these policies to include all 
felony convictions and even some misdemeanors as well.”). 
 324. See, e.g., OHIO JAIL ADMINISTRATORS, OHIO JAIL ADMINISTRATOR’S HANDBOOK 59 
(2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.drc.state.oh.us/web/JailAdministratorHandbook.pdf; 
Zach Pluhacek, State DNA Database To More Than Double Under New Law, LINCOLN J. 
STAR ONLINE (Aug. 7, 2010, 12:55 AM) , http://journalstar.com/news/local/crime-and-
courts/state-dna-database-to-more-than-double-under-new-law/article_a459b808-a1b4-11df-
b90d-001cc4c03286.html. 
 325. Pluhacek, supra note 324. 
 326. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special Needs 
Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, 34 
J.L. Med. & Ethics 165, 167 (2006); S.B. 851, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011); see also 
DNARESOURCE.COM, STATE DNA DATABASE LAWS QUALIFYING OFFENSES (2011), available 
at http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/statequalifyingoffenses2011.pdf. 
 327. S.B. 851, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011) (permitting DNA collection from “any 
alien unlawfully present under federal immigration law”). 
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According to the 
National Conference of 
State Legislatures, all 
fifty states and the 
District of Columbia 
require the collection of 
DNA samples from 
newborns for genetic 
screening purposes.328 
Hospitals DNA “stored in state labs 
for anywhere from three 
months to indefinitely, 
depending on the 
state.”329 In some states, 
genetic screening for 
diseases is conducted by 
taking blood samples of 
the newborn child without 
parental consent.330 
“Bring Your Genes to 
Cal” 
University of California, 
Berkeley 
Since 2010, incoming 
freshmen at UC Berkeley 
can voluntarily submit to 
genetic testing.331 
Table 12. Examples of Fingerprint Data Harvesting Programs 
Program Entity Description 
Secure Communities (S-
COMM) 
ICE/FBI332 Fingerprint-based arrest 
protocol requiring 
biometric database 
screening of anyone 
apprehended by state and 
local law enforcement 
through DHS and FBI 
databases.333
United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status 
Indicator Technology 
USCIS Requires biometric data 
collection (fingerprint 
scans) of all noncitizen 
                                                                                                                 
 
 328. See Newborn Genetic and Metabolic Disease Screening, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 2007), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/newborn-
genetic-and-metabolic-screening-laws.aspx.  
 329. Elizabeth Cohen, The Government Has Your Baby’s DNA, CNN.COM (Feb. 4, 2010, 
9:11 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/HEALTH/02/04/baby.dna.government/index.html. 
 330. Id. 
 331. Ferris Jabr, California Legislators’ Effort To Prevent Student DNA Testing Could 
Come Too Late: A New Bill Is Designed To Halt Berkeley’s Controversial Genetic Testing 
Project, SCIENTIFICAMERICAN.COM (July 9, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=berkeley-bill-dna-testing. 
 332. All state and local law enforcement agencies are required to implement S-COMM 
by 2013 by DHS mandate. See Secure Communities, supra note 131. “As of August 22, 
2012, the biometric information sharing capability [of S-COMM] is activated in 3,074 
jurisdictions in 50 states, 4 territories and Washington D.C. During FY2013, ICE plans to 
use this capability nationwide.” U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED 
JURISDICTIONS (2012), available at https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-
activated2.pdf. 
 333. See Secure Communities, supra note 131. 
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(US-VISIT), 




visitors to the United 
States.334 
Fingerprint Scanning 




“[V]isitors to Disney 
World must now provide 
a fingerprint in an effort to 






Utilized by numerous 
state bankers associations, 
thumb scan may be 
required to open a bank 
account or to cash a 
check.337
CLEAR Pass or  
ClearMe.com 
Private airport screening “CLEAR automates the 
identity check process 
using biometrics, 
(fingerprints and iris).”338 
MorphoTrak339  Private health clubs Index fingerprint used for 
gym membership.340 
Anti-Gang Neighborhood 
Protection Act of 2009 
(California)341 
Private gun dealers Effective February 1, 
2011, submission of 
fingerprints required to 
purchase ammunition in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 334. See Fact Sheet: US-VISIT Program, supra note 312. 
 335. Cate, supra note 34, at 459 (footnote omitted). 
 336. See e.g., Thumbprint Signature Program, IND. BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.indiana
bankers.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=16#.T1OKZvGPWf4; Thumbprint 
Signature Program—Check Fraud Deterrent, N.Y. BANKERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nyba.com/profitsolutions/thumbprint-signature-program-check-fraud-deterrent/. 
 337. See Pascal Fletcher, No Thumbprint, No Money, Bank Tells Armless Man, REUTERS 
(Sept. 3, 2009, 10:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/03/us-bank-thumbprint-
idUSTRE58247Y20090903. 
 338. Home, CLEAR, http://clearme.com. CLEAR’s website provides a brief explanation 
of how expedited airport screening is conducted by the private corporation, including 
background check that requires collection of biometric data (fingerprints and iris scans). See 
CLEAR FAQs, CLEAR, http://clearme.com/faqs. This service is offered at Denver 
International Airport (DEN), Orlando International Airport (MCO), San Francisco 
International Airport (SFO), Dallas/Ft Worth International Airport (DFW), and Westchester 
NY Airport (HPN). Id. 
 339. 24-Hour Fitness utilizes MorphoTrak, a biometric scanning technology, and adopted 
a test pilot program in sixty gyms in California in August 2010. Demian Bulwa, Fingerprint 
Check-in Tried at 24 Hour Fitness, SFGATE.COM (Aug. 23, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/23/MN201EVV36.DTL. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Assemb. B. 962, Ch. 628, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
2013] BIOMETRIC ID CYBERSURVEILLANCE 1533 
 
California. Requires that 
all ammunition sales in 
California involve a face-
to-face transaction and 
fingerprint registration of 
the purchasers. Use of 
online sites or catalogues 
requires ammunition 
shipped to a local gun 
dealer: transaction must 
be performed in person 
under the law.342 
Table 13. Examples of Facial Recognition Data Harvesting Programs 
Program Entity Description 
REAL ID Act of 2005 & 
Driver’s License Facial 
Recognition Application 
DHS At least thirty-four states 
use facial recognition 
systems to “verify a 
person’s claimed identity 
and track down people 
who have multiple 
licenses under different 
aliases.”343
U.S. Passports and 
e-Passports 
DoS Passports and e-
Passports require digital 
photo that is provided to 
centralized facial 
recognition database.344 
E-Verify Photo Tool345 
(incorporated into E-
Verify in 2007)346 
USCIS/SSA Allows employers to 
match the photo on an 
employee’s EAD 
                                                                                                                 
 
 342. Fresno County Superior Court Judge Jeffrey Hamilton ruled the law unconstitutional 
in January 2011. Parker v. California, No. 10 CECG 02116 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2011). 
 343. Meghan E. Irons, Caught in a Dragnet, BOS. GLOBE (July 17, 2011), http://www.
boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/07/17/man_sues_registry_after_license_
mistakenly_revoked/?page=full. Although REAL ID does not require facial recognition 
technology, the statute is the impetus behind state adoption of this technology. JANICE 
KEPHART, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, REAL ID IMPLEMENTATION ANNUAL REPORT: 
MAJOR PROGRESS MADE IN SECURING DRIVER’S LICENSE ISSUANCE AGAINST IDENTITY THEFT 
AND FRAUD (2012), available at http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2012/real-id-
2012.pdf. 
 344. The U.S. Electronic Passport, supra note 183. 
 345. See GAO EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION, supra note 109, at 11 (“For noncitizens who 
show a Permanent Resident (‘green’) card or employment authorization document as proof 
of identity and employment eligibility, the system is to transmit a digitally stored photograph 
of the employee to the employer. It is the employer’s responsibility to determine whether the 




Document] or a 
Permanent Residence 
Card (“green card”) to 
the photo that USCIS has 
on file for that 
employee.347
Scotland Yard’s 
identification of rioters 
after 2011 London riots 
Scotland Yard via 
Facebook & Twitter 
Surveillance technology 
(CCTV) interfaces facial 
recognition software 
with social media sites 
(Facebook and Twitter) 
to identify rioters.348 
B. Identity Verification Through Biometric Data Matching 
Once biometric data has been harvested, it must be compiled within a database, 
which in turn makes possible identity screening: the verification of a person’s 
identity by matching him or her with the data concerning that person in the 
database. Although an oversimplification, the use of biometric data in identity 
verification can be described as a four-step process: Enrollment, Capture, 
Comparison, and Decision.349 Each step is briefly summarized as follows. (1) 
Enrollment: An individual first identifies himself and actually puts his fingerprint 
down, has a digital photo taken, has eyes scanned, etc. (2) Capture for Recognition: 
A template for that identity is created to use for future identification purposes. (3) 
                                                                                                                 
photograph provided by the employee matches the electronic photograph provided by E-
Verify.” (footnote omitted)). 
 346. Id. at 22 (“USCIS has taken actions to address fraud, most notably with the fiscal 
year 2007 implementation of the photo matching tool, which seeks to reduce fraud 
associated with the use of genuine documents in which the original photograph is substituted 
for another.”). 
 347. Id. 
 348. See UK Using Facial Recognition To Hunt Rioters, CBSNEWS.COM (Aug. 11, 2011, 
10:55 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20091186.html. 
 349. See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 3, at 23–27; BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 
25–26. For clarification, not all protocols involve all four steps. However, any given protocol 
could involve the four-step process during any given encounter, depending on what is being 
asked of the data collector and data screener. Also, I note that Vacca identifies a three-part 
procedure: “Enrollment,” “Verification” (“Comparison”), and “Identification” (“Decision”). 
VACCA, supra note 3, at 23–27. For the purposes of further clarification, I have described the 
Enrollment process as a four-part procedure, breaking the Enrollment procedure down into 
two separate parts: “Enrollment” and “Capture for Recognition.” Other experts have 
described the biometric data enrollment and recognition process as a five-part procedure: 
“Enrollment and Recognition Phases,” “Sensor [M]odule” (selecting appropriate sensor or 
biometric reader for biometric data “Capture”), “Feature [E]xtraction [M]odule” (process of 
biometric data “Capture”), “Database [M]odule” (“Comparison”), and “Matching [M]odule” 
(“Decision”). See JAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 4–10. For ease of description, I have included 
the process of sensor module selection as a part of the Enrollment process. 
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Comparison: The individual’s currently presented biometric data (e.g., fingerprint 
or iris scan) is cross-referenced with the originally presented biometric data (e.g., 
enrollment and identity template). And (4) Decision: Statistical algorithms are 
developed to “match” the probability that the initial biometric data can be 
accurately compared to the currently presented biometric data or to make a 
determination that the data does not “match.” 
As a brief overview, it is significant to observe that the utilization of biometric 
data for mass identification on a scale of 300 million individuals or more—the 
population of the United States—is considered highly experimental.350 The 
development of automated biometric ID data matching systems through digitalized 
credentialing is both experimental technologically and policy-wise. Based on recent 
comprehensive immigration reform bills and other immigration legislation, 
however, it appears this experimental technology and policy prescription has been 
growing steadily in acceptance over the past decade. 
Yet, many experts have concluded that biometric data is an unstable and 
unreliable foundation for verifying identity on an automated mass scale of hundreds 
of millions of individuals.351 The reason is relatively straightforward. Unlike other 
identity verification protocols where there is a 100% accuracy match rate in the 
decision (e.g., through 100% match of a PIN number or 100% match of an identity 
security token), in biometric identity verification, 100% accuracy is a 100% 
technological impossibility. In fact, 100% accuracy in biometric identity 
verification is a sign of fraud.352 Consequently, at any level below 100% accuracy, 
identity verification in biometric technology necessitates an ironic conclusion: you 
may not be able to confirm your identity because of inaccuracies in the data or 
because of other technological limitations. 
Accepting false positives and false negatives, therefore, are the necessary 
preconditions for adopting biometric identity verification technology. For example, 
if, on a scale of one to one hundred, seventy is deemed as the minimum score 
needed for a match, there will be some individuals scoring below seventy that have 
given genuine fingerprints. Likewise, there will be some individuals scoring above 
seventy that have given fraudulent fingerprints. The higher the minimum score, the 
less often fraudulent fingerprints are returned as a match, but the more often 
genuine fingerprints may be rejected. Who decides what accuracy level is 
appropriate for the purposes at hand and how that accuracy rate is assessed 
becomes critically important. Currently, the federal government outsources the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 350. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 3, at 5 (explaining the experimental nature of biometric 
ID technologies); MAGNET, supra note 3, at 3–16, 30–31; GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 3, at 136–221 (describing the projected maturation process of the testing and 
implementation of various biometric identification technologies). 
 351. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at viii–ix (discussing experimental 
nature of biometric recognition and matching technologies). 
 352. See id. at 4–5, 12 (“A biometric match represents not certain recognition but a 
probability of correct recognition [based on statistical algorithms that match biometric data 
captured with biometric databases.]”). Because biometric identity verification matching 
depends on probabilistic matching, the determination is always less than 100%. See id. 
Therefore, the only way one could reach a 100% match through biometric verification 
matching is through tampering or other system compromise. See id. 
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management of its biometric identification technologies to private corporate 
“vendors.”353 Vendors are not required to test for accuracy and also are not required 
to provide results of “no-matches,” or how a “match” or “no-match” is decided, to 
the government.354 There is no regulatory body of the federal government that 
oversees what biometric data standards or technologies are considered minimally 
proficient.355 
Moreover, utilizing a digitalized biometric ID or biometric database screening 
technology removes the matching process from the trained expertise of specific 
forensic experts and places the matching process into an automated system. The 
accuracy of the automated biometric data matching process, therefore, is driven by 
the capabilities and limitations of the software (e.g., the statistical algorithms) and 
the hardware (e.g., the scanning technology that collects the data and the sorting 
technology that analyzes the data). The accuracy of the assessment also depends 
upon the technological proficiencies of those tasked with enrolling the initial 
biometric data (e.g., establishing the initial biometric data template) and the capture 
of future biometric data (e.g., law enforcement or immigration agents seeking 
biometric data through portable, handheld biometric screeners (or mobile biometric 
sensors) to compare captured biometric data with the government’s biometric 
databases). 
In short, both the underlying databases and the database screening technology, 
and the attendant scientific and programmatic safeguards required to regulate the 
databases and technology, have been unable to keep up with the burdens 
increasingly placed on such systems.356 Nevertheless, multiple statutes and the 
programs they authorize advanced since the 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrate that 
database screening technologies and biometric data, in particular, are increasingly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 353. Id. at 8 (describing the difficulty of assessing the capability of a potential vendor’s 
technology). 
 354. Because these technologies are emerging and experimental, they have not been 
thoroughly peer reviewed. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 3, at 59 (“It’s important to 
realize that none of the [biometric] techniques mentioned here have gone through the kind of 
thorough peer review that was required of DNA fingerprinting in the 1980s and early 
1990s.” (emphasis in original)). Private biotech corporations, also referred to as vendors, 
largely control the testing of biometric verification technologies. See, e.g., GAO 
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 58 (“Biometric companies have primarily been 
concerned with testing the accuracy of their technologies in highly controlled environments, 
using static or artificially generated templates, images, and data. The results of their tests, as 
quoted by vendors, are quite extraordinary . . . because the performance of a technology 
depends greatly on how and where it is deployed, such numbers have proven to be far more 
impressive than real-life performance data.”). 
 355. Currently, NIST is tasked with overseeing testing of biometric technologies by the 
federal government but does not set minimally proficient standards. See GAO TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 54 (“Biometric technologies are maturing but are still not 
widespread or pervasive because of performance issues, including accuracy, the lack of 
applications-dependent evaluations, their potential susceptibility to deception, the lack of 
standards, and questions of users’ acceptance.”). 
 356. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CONGRESSIONAL 
RESPONSE REPORT: ACCURACY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S NUMIDENT FILE 
(2006), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-08-06-26100.pdf. 
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viewed by policymakers as a zero-risk tolerance solution to the problem of identity 
verification in order to secure the border.357 
C. Limitations of Biometric Data Matching and Biometric ID Technologies 
Biometric database screening is increasingly viewed by some key policymakers 
as the “gold standard” by which to accurately verify identity and citizenship 
status.358 In the context of homeland security policy and immigration control, 
therefore, biometric technology is increasingly considered by the political branches 
as an efficacious solution because it adopts the “gold standard” of identification for 
identity management systems.359 Consequently, it is characterized in policy 
proposals as one of the most effective methods by which to prescreen individuals 
before the grant of certain rights and privileges. As discussed above, identity 
management tools and systems attempt to verify identity before authorizing the 
right to work (e.g., E-Verify),360 the right to drive (e.g., REAL ID driver’s 
licenses),361 the right to vote (e.g., Help America Vote Act),362 in order to more 
effectively secure the border and screen out the potential terrorist and criminal alien 
or unlawfully present immigrant. Yet, biometric technologies are not without 
problems and limits. 
Many experts have concluded that the technology and processes required to 
safely and accurately conduct the automated biometric matching of hundreds of 
millions of individuals on a national scale simply do not exist.363As explained in 
Biometric Recognition: Challenges and Opportunities, a report published by the 
National Academies Press, edited by Joseph N. Pato and Lynette I. Millet, a science 
fiction understanding of biometric data screening and sorting technology often 
governs debates about the efficacy of such technology.364 Popular misconceptions 
                                                                                                                 
 
 357. See, e.g., FROOMKIN & WEINBERG, supra note 3. 
 358. See Alan Gomez, Immigrant Tracking May Impede Bill; Partisan Split Developing 
over Biometric Data on Foreigners Leaving U.S., USA TODAY, May 9, 2013, at A5 
(“[Former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael] Chertoff calls [biometrics] the 
‘gold standard.’”). 
 359. See supra notes 2, 4, 39, and accompanying text. 
 360. E-Verify as of yet does not require a biometric data identifier. However, 
congressional proposals surrounding the extension of the E-Verify program have discussed 
adding a biometric verification component. See supra notes 37, 238, and accompanying text 
(discussing BELIEVE). 
 361. Similarly, although the REAL ID Act of 2005 does not require the biometric 
verification of a fingerprint, REAL ID does include technological enhancements and requires 
digital photos that can be analyzed with facial recognition software. See REAL ID Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 362. Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which relies upon SSA database 
screening of Social Security Numbers, does not yet require a biometric data matching 
component. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2006) (implementing provision); GAO EMPLOYMENT 
VERIFICATION, supra note 109; REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(b)–(d), 119 
Stat. 302, 312–14 (implementing provisions). 
 363. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at vi–ix. 
 364. Id. 
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regarding the capabilities of biometric identification have been entrenched through 
cultural influences, such as science fiction and futuristic films.365 These cultural 
biases complicate an ability to grasp the distinction between the efficacy of 
individualized biometric matching based on case-by-case determinations that utilize 
the training and judgment of human experts (e.g., a forensics expert at a crime 
scene), on the one hand, and mass biometric matching of millions of individuals 
based on large-scale, digitally generated determinations, on the other hand.366  
Another risk arising from the removal of the biometric data matching process 
from a specific and narrowly tailored context (such as a prosecutorial context for 
the purposes of establishing evidence for specific crimes) to a universal and 
general-purpose context (such as identity and citizenship status verification) is that 
it significantly increases the potential for the future abuse of biometric data. The 
potential misuse or unlawful treatment of such data matching or data screening 
protocols by both the public and private sectors is expanded, therefore. Genetic 
ethicists note that attempts by scientists to decode DNA in recent decades, for 
example, have led to classifications that draw correlative evidence between genetic 
markers that signify race, ethnicity, religion, etc., and behavioral analytics such as 
criminal disposition, intelligence testing, etc.367 The private health information that 
could be yielded through a universal DNA database would require a 
reconceptualization of what medical privacy could be protected once such a 
database exists.368 Therefore, experts predict that a universal DNA database poses 
risks of demographic and behavioral profiling, as well as health and medical 
profiling, in ways that may be challenging or impossible to regulate or mitigate.369 
Further, the premature adoption of a biometric-based identification system on a 
mass scale is advised against in part because of the severe restrictions on an 
individual’s ability to exercise due process rights.370 For example, such a system 
would likely neither allow for an interrogation of the “chain of evidence” nor afford 
a process for confronting the databases or algorithms from which the conclusions 
are drawn, let alone the individuals charged with implementing the screening.371 
Many identity management programs already in place demonstrate 
programmatic challenges that can stem from the lack of expertise of those tasked 
with the collection of the personally identifiable data and conducting the database 
screening. DHS, for example, delegates implementation of the E-Verify program to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. 
 367. See, e.g., DUSTER, supra note 263. For an excellent discussion on how developments 
in neuroscience pose similar challenges to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, see 
respectively Farahany, Searching Secrets, supra note 6; Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 
supra note 6. 
 368. See generally DUSTER, supra note 263 (describing the implications for racial 
profiling of a national DNA database in criminal law). 
 369. See, e.g., EUGENE THACKER, THE GLOBAL GENOME: BIOTECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND 
CULTURE (2005). 
 370. BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 10–11. 
 371. See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic 
Science, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1209 (2010); Roth, supra note 29. 
2013] BIOMETRIC ID CYBERSURVEILLANCE 1539 
 
employers, who agree to screen new hires through DHS and SSA databases.372 
DHS also delegates implementation of the S-COMM program to state law 
enforcement officials, who agree to collect and screen the biometric data (e.g., 
fingerprints) of arrestees through DHS and FBI databases.373 Those screened face 
potential legal and other consequences depending on the results of the experimental 
database screening. Thus, serious questions remain as to whether such digital data 
collection and database-screening protocols are appropriately delegated to state and 
private actors for federal identity verification purposes. A separate question 
remains as to whether these actors should be empowered to impose, in a de facto 
manner, downstream consequences,374 such as the denial of employment 
opportunities and deportation proceedings, through database screening, especially 
if such actors fail to properly collect and screen the data pursuant to the federal 
government’s guidelines.  
In addition, to ground concretely the limitations of such technology, it is 
instructive to examine the challenges faced by the government in the 
implementation of a government-wide digitalized biometric ID program. The 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as well as other scientists 
and experts have identified a variety of concerns surrounding biometric ID data as a 
primary data point for identification.375 These concerns include liveness detection, 
revocability, reliability, and security. 
1. Liveness Detection 
Studies on biometric identification technologies have indicated that biometric 
fraud is possible due to technological limitations in detecting biometric “liveness.” 
In other words, how does the system recognize whether the fingerprint that is being 
scanned digitally has been stolen and has been replicated? For example, how does 
the scanner detect whether it is digitally scanning latex gloves or silicone-sculpted 
fingerprint tips? How does any system administrator ensure that the individual 
using the system is using a live fingerprint? The biotech industry has not yet 
developed the technology yet to ensure the fingerprint is not forged. Even if a 
system administrator is watching an individual provide a fingerprint, they may not 
be able to tell whether the fingerprint is “live” or forged. Research done in this area 
is sparse, and, currently, no verifiable standards exist.376 
                                                                                                                 
 
 372. See generally GAO EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION, supra note 109. 
 373. See Secure Communities, supra note 131. 
 374. Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(exploring the manner in which state criminal courts and prosecutors are seizing the reins of 
federal policymaking discretion through state and local immigration screening and exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion, resulting in downstream consequences, such as deportation). 
 375. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at viii–ix (discussing experimental 
nature of biometric matching technologies); WILLIAM MACGREGOR, KETAN MEHTA, DAVID 
COOPER & KAREN SCARFONE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECHS., A RECOMMENDATION 
FOR THE USE OF PIV CREDENTIALS IN PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS (PACS), 12–15 
(2008) (describing some “known technical threats” to PIV system); MAGNET, supra note 3, 
at 3–16, 30–31. 
 376. See MAGNET, supra note 3, at 27 (citing various studies verifying methods for 
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2. Revocability 
Currently, there is no remedy available if an individual’s biometric data is 
stolen. Technologically, there is no way to develop encryptions within our 
biometric data because our biometric data is derived from our body. For instance, if 
someone steals biometric information that is embedded in a microchip on a gym 
card or bank card, this biometric information can be used to perpetrate the 
acquisition of a fraudulent biometric-based REAL ID driver’s license. NIST also 
notes that there is no research on how robust fingerprint data is over time or how 
data captured on one type of machine would be translated once newer technology is 
used to replace older hardware or obsolete software.377 
3. Reliability 
In biometric-verification technology, accuracy improves if all other factors 
remain stable in the environment. For example, NIST has learned through PIV 
card/biometric ID card implementation that the same vendor should be used to 
ensure higher accuracy.378 Biometric technology users are instructed to attempt to 
ensure that the environment for the biometric data enrollment and the verification 
are identical (e.g., attempt to use same staff, same room, same lighting, and same 
humidity levels).379 In addition, experts have realized that biometric verification 
systems need to develop an alternative system for people with no fingerprints, those 
with “damaged” fingerprints, dysplasia resulting in no lines in fingerprints, and so 
forth.380 Biometric research has determined that biometric data is less accurate and 
harder to recognize for women (fine skin and less defined fingerprints due to 
housecleaning solution and face cleansing) and the elderly (loss of collagen).381 
                                                                                                                 
successfully circumventing biometric technology, including artificial gelatin imprints). 
 377. JAIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 37. 
 378. Due to these concerns, the NIST began a program for evaluating and setting 
standards for vendor interoperability, called MINEX. See generally MINEX Overview, 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECHS. (OCT. 27, 2011), http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/minex.
cfm. 
 379. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 8 (“Achieving automated 
recognition involves the proper functioning of a broader system with many elements, 
including the human sources of data, human operators of the system, the collection 
environment(s), biometric sensors, the quality of the system’s various technological 
components, the human-sensor-environment interaction, biometric reference information 
databases and the quality and integrity of the data therein . . . .”). 
 380. See SAMIR NANAVATI, MICHAEL THIEME, RAJ NANAVATI, BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY 
VERIFICATION IN A NETWORKED WORLD 59–60 (2002) (“Certain ethnic and demographic 
groups have lower-quality fingerprints and are more difficult to enroll than others. IBG’s 
Comparative Biometric Testing has shown that elderly populations, manual laborers, and 
some Asian populations are more likely to be unable to enroll in some finger-scan 
systems.”). 
 381. See The Real World Is Diverse, LUMIDIGM, http://www.lumidigm.com/population-
characteristics/ (“Age is another physiological characteristic that can affect the ability of a 
[biometric] sensor to collect a usable fingerprint image. One effect of aging is the loss of 
collagen in the skin; elderly fingers have soft fingerprint ridges that collapse into each other 
when the finger touches a surface. Because many sensor technologies depend on the quality 
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Biometric research has also determined that the statistical algorithms have a 
racially disparate impact in accuracy for reasons that are not fully understood.382 
Finally, biometric technology has not yet adopted a uniform standard domestically 
or internationally. Some advocate adoption of the INTERPOL fingerprinting 
standard, which is similar to the American standard (e.g., using image and points 
within fingerprint). This matter, however, remains unresolved.383 
4. Security 
As discussed above, many experts have concluded that the technology does not 
currently exist to support a reliable biometric ID data matching system on a 
national, mass scale. Such a system would require the accurate and secure capture, 
storage, data use, and analysis of the biometric data of hundreds of millions of 
citizens and noncitizens.384 Research is still needed to develop an accurate scientific 
foundation to support mass biometric matching systems.385 Additionally, experts 
note the inability to safeguard biometric data because, for example, we leave our 
fingerprints and DNA traces everywhere we go.386 Therefore, it is difficult to 
protect biometric data from nonconsensual data capture and database screening,387 
and identity theft vulnerabilities.388 Because biometric data cannot be safeguarded, 
it is among the least secure forms of personally identifiable data. As one security 
expert explained it succinctly: “[B]iometrics are easy to steal. . . . Biometrics are 
unique identifiers, but they’re not secrets.”389 Yet, as also observed above, other 
experts note that the new post-9/11 national security paradigm of zero-risk 
tolerance applies pressure on policymakers to develop solutions that reduce the 
statistical risk of terrorist attack, even as experts note that the real risk of terrorism 
cannot be reduced.390 Thus, it should be noted that some experts contend a 
                                                                                                                 
of contact between the finger and the sensor to collect a good image, soft fingerprint ridges 
can be difficult to image.”); see also MAGNET, supra note 3, at 30. 
 382. See, e.g., MAGNET, supra note 3, at 28–29. 
 383. See VACCA, supra note 3, at 65 (describing ongoing attempts to create generic 
international biometric standards). 
 384. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 3, at 5 (“Even very small 
probabilities of misrecognitions—the failure to recognize an enrolled individual or the 
recognition of one individual as another—can become operationally significant when an 
application is scaled to handle millions of recognition attempts.”). 
 385. Id. at 13 (“[A] scientific basis is needed for the distinctiveness and stability of 
various biometric traits under a variety of collection processes and environments and across 
a wide population over decades.”). 
 386. See, e.g., Schneier, supra note 5. 
 387. See, e.g., Farahany, Searching Secrets, supra note 6, at 1281 (“Should the motorist 
refuse to provide her identity, the police might nevertheless employ biometric technology to 
quickly and unobtrusively identify her.”). 
 388. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 6. 
 389. Schneier, supra note 5. 
 390. See, e.g., BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, UNCONQUERABLE NATION: KNOWING OUR 
ENEMY, STRENGTHENING OURSELVES 152–54 (2006). 
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biometric national ID card will not increase security and, in fact, could increase 
national security risks.391 
IV. OVERVIEW OF BUREAUCRATIZED CYBERSURVEILLANCE 
More and more policy experts are calling for multimodal biometric 
identification systems—for instance, which combine facial recognition, 
fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA—to increase the reliability of identity 
screening systems.392 Yet, the surveillance consequences of such programs and 
protocols are obscured because they are implemented in a manner that may appear 
to be reasonable (e.g., ID cards)393 and expected (e.g., identity or citizenship status 
verification protocols).394 Additionally, the surveillance consequences are also 
obscured because these methodologies may appear on their face to be consensual 
(e.g., voluntarily submitting to Internet database-screening protocols which, in turn, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 391. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, A National ID Card Wouldn’t Make Us Safer, SCHNEIER 
ON SEC. (Apr. 1, 2004), http://www.schneier.com/essay-034.html; Jim Harper, Rejecting 
National ID, AMERICAN SPECTATOR (Feb. 7, 2008, 12:06 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/
2008/02/07/rejecting-national-id. But see The Case for a National ID Card, WASH. POST 
OPINIONS (Feb. 2, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-02/opinions/
36701587_1_illegal-immigrants-immigration-reform-immigration-system. 
 392. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 3, at 442 (explaining FBI’s expansion of biometric 
data collection under NGI: “The solution was to move beyond a unimodal biometric 
identifier (e.g., fingerprints), and towards multimodal biometric identifiers, such as FRT 
[facial recognition technology], and voice, iris recognition technologies.”); LYNCH, supra 
note 3, at 10 (“Traditionally, biometrics databases such as IAFIS and IDENT have collected 
only one biometric at a time. However, the government has argued these ‘unimodal’ systems 
are limited and has been pushing to develop ‘multimodal’ systems that collect and combine 
two or more biometrics (for example, photographs and fingerprints). The government argues 
that collecting multiple biometrics from each subject will make identification systems more 
accurate.” (footnote omitted)); GAO TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 3; Kephart, 
supra note 260; Measuring the Outcomes, supra note 260; Wilson, supra note 260. 
 393. In deciding to relinquish privacy rights, some scholars have observed that what 
appears to be reasonable cognitively is transforming in the realm of modern society and 
cyberspace transactions in particular. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 10; Jerry Kang, 
Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (1998). Some 
scholars attribute this to an asymmetrical information problem. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, 
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004). Examining privacy 
torts or privacy expectations in privacy law can be instructive in light of the challenges of 
modern technology and data breaches. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. 
Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2011); Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1887 (2010). 
 394. Reasonable expectations of privacy are notoriously difficult to define, especially in 
the data privacy context. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy 
and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1397 (2000); Christopher Slobogin, 
Proportionality, Privacy, and Public Opinion: A Reply to Kerr and Swire, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1588 (2010); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of 
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings 
Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993). 
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permits the harvesting, aggregation, and analysis of identity data).395 Further, the 
manner in which personally identifiable data is shared by the citizen with the 
government or other third parties may not appear to implicate traditional privacy 
concerns (e.g., employer identity database screening of employees as directed by 
law as a precondition for hiring).396 One of the hallmarks of cutting-edge 
cybersurveillance is that it can also be conducted remotely and automatically,397 
virtually and near invisibly,398 constantly and near costlessly.399 
A. Bureaucratized Cybersurveillance Programs and Dataveillance Protocols 
The process of surveillance normalization that now appears to be unfolding 
tracks a transition from an era of traditional bureaucratized surveillance to an era of 
bureaucratized cybersurveillance. Identity verification programs and protocols—
including programs which incorporate immigration status screening and citizenship 
status checks—can be executed through traditional bureaucratized surveillance 
(e.g., physical document inspection) or through bureaucratized cybersurveillance 
(e.g., collection of personally identifiable data and database screening). Identity 
verification screening protocols have traditionally entailed the request for the 
production of identity and immigration or travel documents. During the course of 
the inspection, the inspector confirms the document is valid, unexpired, and relates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 395. Many scholars have theorized the profound social and legal impact of technological 
innovation and the Internet in particular on society and a digital civilization. See, e.g., 
LESSIG, supra note 8; MARK POSTER, INFORMATION PLEASE: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE 
AGE OF DIGITAL MACHINES (2006); JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—
AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461 (2000). 
 396. The law of information privacy has been described by scholars as “increasingly 
fragmented and decreasingly coherent.” Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2010). Even when privacy is intended to be protected, some 
scholars have noted the manner in which this protection fails in the cyberprivacy context. 
Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); see also Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 
131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 which makes E-
Verify Internet database screening mandatory for all Arizona employers); NASA v. Nelson, 
131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) (upholding background check procedure in HSPD-12 as not violating 
right to informational privacy). 
 397. The automatic disclosure of information to automated third parties and automated 
decision making by agencies both present novel constitutional concerns. See, e.g., Danielle 
Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008); Matthew 
Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581 (2011). 
 398. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK, supra note 21. For post-9/11 developments in 
surveillance and dataveillance technology, see O’HARROW, supra note 3; PRIEST & ARKIN, 
supra note 13. 
 399. Data-driven cybersurveillance and dataveillance impose minimal costs on persons 
collecting the data transmittal of the digital data, as compared with traditional forms of 
surveillance (e.g., assigning an agent to physically follow a suspect). Although the collection 
and transmittal of data may not be as costly, cybersurveillance and dataveillance methods are 
not cost free. The maintenance, aggregation, and analysis of databases can entail tremendous 
expense. 
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to the person producing the ID. Increasingly, however, identity verification 
protocols utilize both the physical inspection of identity documents, as well as 
Internet-driven or digitalized data-driven screening through public and private 
databases. Policymakers are increasingly calling for the implementation of a 
digitalized national ID system to facilitate universal data collection and database 
screening to verify identity.400 
Tables 14 and 15 show how traditional forms of bureaucratized surveillance are 
transforming in light of emerging cybersurveillance and dataveillance technologies 
and programs. Table 14 focuses on the broad categories of traditional 
bureaucratized surveillance. Table 15 focuses on how bureaucratized 
cybersurveillance is adding an entirely new cybersurveillance and dataveillance 
dimension to the protocols of traditional bureaucratized surveillance. 
Table 14. Examples of Bureaucratized Surveillance v.  
Bureaucratized Cybersurveillance 




Identity Cards Passport; driver’s license; 
Social Security Card; etc. 
e-Passports; RFID-enhanced 
passports and other digitalized 
IDs; REAL ID Act driver’s 
licenses and RFID-enhanced 
driver’s licenses; RFID-
enabled smart cards; GPS-
enabled smartphones as form 
of digitalized ID; proposals for 





protocols; requirements to 
carry identity papers on the 
body; paper files and 
dossiers; nondigitalized 
databases; etc. 
Automated and invisible 
geolocational, biometric, 
behavioral, and biographical 
data tracking; digital dossiers; 





population mapping; etc. 
Group-based and pattern-
based data aggregators and 
data refineries; data-driven 





Document production and 
inspection procedures (e.g., 
“Show Me Your Papers” 
protocols) 
Delegation of data collection 
and database screening to 
private sector and states; 
remote and automatic data 
collection and screening; data 
                                                                                                                 
 
 400. See, e.g., Yadron, supra note 239; see also Jim Harper, Internal Enforcement, E-
Verify, and the Road to a National ID, 32 CATO J. 125, 130 (2012). 
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mining and data matching; 
data aggregation; database 
screening, including Internet-
based screening; algorithms 
attempting to authenticate 
identity and attempting to 
predict or analyze 
biographical and behavioral 
data 
Table 15. Examples of Emerging Protocols Under  
Bureaucratized Cybersurveillance 








inspection of passport, visa, 
etc. 
e-Passport, RFID-enhanced 
passports and other digitalized 
IDs; US-VISIT (digitalized 
collection and screening of 
biometric data of all 
noncitizens visiting the United 
States); BCC (digitalized 
biometric-based border 
crossing card); database 
screening through TECS, 
ATS, TIDE, SEVIS, etc.; 
America’s Shield Initiative 
(ASI) and Integrated 
Surveillance Intelligence 
System (ISIS); drones; search 
and seizure of information 
technologies (laptops, 
mobiles, and smartphones) 
Airport Screening Physical document 
inspection of driver’s 
license, physical 
screenings, etc. 
CLEAR Pass or ClearMe.com 
(digitalized collection of 
biometric data to expedite 
traveler screening); Global 
Online Enrollment System 
(GOES) or Global Entry 
Trusted Traveler System; 
Secure Flight and “No-Fly 
List” (database screening and 
aggregation of multiple 
databases to predict threat 
risk); body scanners 
Employment Physical document Social Security Number 




inspection of Social 
Security Card, driver’s 
license, etc., pursuant to 
Form I-9 (employment 
eligibility verification 
process) 
screening and database 
screening of other personally 
identifiable data (e.g., Social 
Security Number Verification 
System (SSNVS) and 
E-Verify database screening 
as required under state 
immigration laws); E-Verify 
Photo Tool (digitalized photo 
databases); Social Security 
Number “DHS No-Match 
Rule” (rescinded) 
Voter ID Laws402 Physical document 
inspection 
Social Security Number 
screening and database 
screening of other personally 
identifiable data (HAVA 
database matching) 
“Stop and Identify” 
Laws403 
Physical document 
inspection of driver’s 
license and identity 
documents 
Department of Motor Vehicles 
database screening; potential 
use of social network 
screening technologies (e.g., 
Lighthouse) and biometric 
data screening (e.g., MORIS, 
HIIDE) 
“Show Me Your 
Papers” Laws404 
Physical document 
inspection of identity and 
immigration documents 
Biometric data screening 
(fingerprint scans) under 
Section 1373(c) of the INA 
and S-COMM (digitalized 
collection of biometric data to 
facilitate immigration and 
criminal records screening); 
National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) and other 
databases 
                                                                                                                 
 
 401. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101, 
100 Stat. 3359, 3360 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a); Hu, supra note 13, 
at 564–65, 579–86; Lee, supra note 13, at 1110–33. 
 402. See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, 
and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1023, 1034 (2009) (“[M]odern voter 
identification laws–specifically, those voter identification laws that require the presentation 
of a government-issued photographic identification card–focus most clearly on [a] proof-of-
identity requirement. The key issue for these laws is what forms of information the voter 
must gather to prove his or her identity when registering and when appearing to vote.”). 
 403. Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination 
Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1891–97 (2005) (discussing state “stop and identify” laws 
and the constitutionality of such laws under the Court’s decision in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 
District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004)). 
 404. See Hu, supra note 13 (discussing document-based and database-based screening 
protocols required under federal and state immigration screening). 
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Background Check Screening through data 
files (e.g., criminal records, 
credit reporting, etc.) 
Biometric data screening 
(digitalized collection and 
screening of biometric data); 
behavioral and moral 
character screening through 
social media trawling 
(Facebook, Twitter, Google, 
etc.); data mining (Acxiom, 
LexisNexis, etc.); aggregating 
contextual information; etc. 
B. Rapid Expansion of Post-9/11 Identity Management and Biometric 
Dataveillance Programs 
The identity management phenomenon is rapidly proliferating in the post-9/11 
context. The phenomenon is difficult to examine and interrogate given the nature of 
cybersurveillance and that it is proliferating in a highly bureaucratized context, for 
example, through statutory and regulatory frameworks, and executive orders and 
presidential directives. Moreover, both the administrative and technological 
structures that support it are of an unusually complex and technical nature.  
Table 16 provides examples of some of the identity management programs that 
have been promulgated since 9/11. This table primarily focuses on identity 
verification programs and does not include identity determination or identity 
inference programs, most of which are advanced and implemented through 
executive policies and administrative action. 
Table 16. Examples of Post-9/11 Statutes Creating Identity Management Programs 





Required To Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001)405 
DHS United States Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator 
Technology (US-VISIT), 
incorporating the National 
Security Entry-Exit 
Registration System 
(NSEERS). Section 403(c) 
mandates the development 
of “a technology standard 
that can be used to verify 
the identity of persons 
applying for” or seeking 
entry into the U.S. on a 
visa “for the purposes of 
conducting background 
                                                                                                                 
 
 405. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.). 
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checks, confirming 
identity, and ensuring that 
a person has not received a 




Act [of 2001]407 
DHS Requires cooperation with 
airport operators and 
consideration of the use of 
biometric access control 
systems for identity 
verification408 
Maritime Transportation 
Security Act of 2002409 
DHS Requires biometric 
credential410 
Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry 
Reform Act of 2002 
(EBSVRA)411 
DHS Border Crossing Card: 
Section 303(b)(1) requires 
that “only machine-
readable, tamper-resistant 
visas and other travel and 
entry documents that use 
biometric identifiers” shall 
be issued to aliens by 
October 26, 2004.412 
Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 (HSA)413 
DHS Science and 
Technology Special 
Programs Division. The 
mission of this division is 
to develop technologies 





Special Access Programs 
Control Office.”414 
“In accordance with the 
Homeland Security Act of 
2002, ensuring especially 
sensitive technologies 
involving homeland 
defense are transferred to, 
or coordinated with, the 
Under Secretary for S&T 
[Science & 
Technology].”415 
                                                                                                                 
 
 406. Id. § 403(c), 115 Stat. at 344 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1379 (2006)). 
 407. Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 8331; 26 
U.S.C. § 9502; 31 U.S.C. § 1105; in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). 
 408. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 438. 
 409. Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 70101–
70117). 
 410. The TWIC digitalized biometric credential was implemented in 2007 as a result of 
this Act. Id. § 70105, 116 Stat. at 2073. 
 411. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.). 
 412. Id. § 303(b)(1), 116 Stat. at 553 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006)). 
 413. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of the 
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Homeland Security 
Information Sharing Act 
(included in Homeland 
Security Act of 2002)416 
FBI Expanded IAFIS to 
include classified and 
unclassified information417 
Help America Vote Act 
of 2002 (HAVA)418 
State coordination with 
SSA.419 
Section 15483(a) requires 
each state to implement 
and maintain an electronic 
database of all registered 
voters.420 HAVA also 
requires states to verify the 
identity of the voter 
registration application 
through cross-checking the 
applicant’s driver’s license 
or last four digits of the 
applicant’s Social Security 
Number.421 If the 
individual has neither 
number, the state is 
required to assign a voter 
ID number to the 
applicant.422 
FAA Reauthorization 
Bill (Federal Aviation 
Administration 
Reauthorization Bill, 
also known as Vision 
100—Century of 
Aviation Reauthorization 
Act of 2003)423 
TSA CAPPS2 (Computer 
Assisted Passenger 
Prescreening System) 
(now Secure Flight).424 
Relies upon the Passenger 
Name Record database 
(PNR). Checks the 
passenger’s data against 
                                                                                                                 
U.S.C.). 
 414. Science and Technology Special Programs Division, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1239044157050.shtm. 
 415. Id. 
 416. 6 U.S.C. § 481 (2006). 
 417. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 441. 
 418. Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1666–1730 (2002) (codified as amended at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2006)). 
 419. Implementation of HAVA requires state agency tasked with overseeing election 
rules and procedures for that state to coordinate with SSA in SSN database screening. See 
President Signs H.R. 3295, “Help America Vote Act of 2002,” SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 7, 
2002), http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/legis_bulletin_110702.html. 
 420. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2006). 
 421. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i). 
 422. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(ii). 
 423. Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
 424. Id. at §§ 607–608, 117 Stat. at 2568–70 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44903 
(2006 & Supp. 2010)) (CAPPS2); Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018 (Oct. 28, 
1550 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 88:1475 
 
the TSA “No-Fly List,” 
FBI lists, and assigns a 
terrorist “risk score” 
through statistical 
algorithms.425
Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 (IRTPA)426 
TSA Secure Flight427 passenger 
prescreening program 
through PNR database and 
other databases. Also 
requires the President to 
establish an information 
sharing environment.428 
Real ID Act of 2005 
(REAL ID)429 
TSA REAL ID requires 
technological 
enhancements and data 
gathering requirements for 
driver’s licenses. Directs 
state DMVs to adopt 
practices that permit 
centralization of data. 
Requires production of ID 
documents to DMV prior 
to issuance of license. 
Many states are requiring 
SAVE immigration-related 
database screening before 
issuing driver’s licenses.430 
DNA Fingerprint Act of 
2005431 
FBI Requires the submission of 
DNA samples by all 
citizens and noncitizens in 
detention as a result of any 
arrest or apprehension, 
including misdemeanors, 
                                                                                                                 
2008) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1540, 1544, &1560) (Secure Flight). 
 425. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet CAPPS II: Myths and Facts 
(Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.techlawjournal.com/agencies/dhs/capps/
20040212b.asp. 
 426. Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.). 
 427. Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018, 64,019 (Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified 
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1540, 1544, & 1560) 
 428. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 456. 
 429. Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 49 U.S.C.). 
 430. See id. at § 202, 119 Stat. at 312 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006)). 
 431. Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 3084 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C). 
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made under federal 
authority.432
Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 (DRA)433 
Department of Health 




presentation of original 
identity documents (birth 
certificate) to state 




Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety 
Act of 2006 (Adam 
Walsh Act)436 
FBI437 Allows for the tracking of 
sex offenders with GPS 
technology.438 Requires 
compilation of national 
database registry that 
includes the Social 
Security Number, address, 
employment information, 
and license plate number 




Reauthorization Act of 
2009 (CHIP)440  
HHS Requires verification of 
identity and citizenship 
status through database 
screening prior to issuing 
benefit.441
Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act of 
2010 (ACA or Obama 
Health Care Plan)442 
HHS Requires verification of 
identity and citizenship 
status through database 
screening prior to issuing 
                                                                                                                 
 
 432. Id. § 1004, 119 Stat. at 3085–86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C). 
 433. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of U.S.C.). 
 434. Under implementation of DRA, state benefit granting agencies are charged with 
distributing Medicare/Medicaid benefits. Id. 
 435. § 6036, 120 Stat. at 80 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2006 & Supp. 
2010)). 
 436. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–16929 
(2006 & Supp. 2010)). 
 437. Under implementation of Adam Walsh Act, state parole boards must monitor release 
of sex offenders. Id. § 112, 120 Stat. at 593. 
 438. § 621, 120 Stat. at 633–34 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16981 (2006 & Supp. 2010)). 
 439. §§ 114, 119, 120 Stat. at 594, 596 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16914, 16919 (2006)). 
 440. Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 441. Id. at § 211, 123 Stat. at 49 (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 




Preexisting biometric data collection protocols and the policy drive to expand 
biometric databases appear to create policy and program synergies between 
biometric dataveillance programs. It appears that the mandatory expansion of S-
COMM, for example, was coordinated with the implementation of the FBI’s Next 
Generation Identification (NGI) program.444 Under the FBI’s NGI project, the 
government has announced its attempt to institute a comprehensive, centralized, 
and technologically interoperable biometric database that spans across military and 
national security agencies, as well as all other state and federal government 
agencies.445 Once complete, NGI will strive to centralize whatever biometric data is 
available on all citizens and noncitizens in the United States and abroad, including 
information on fingerprints, DNA, iris scans, voice recognition, and facial 
recognition data captured through digitalized photos, such as U.S. passport photos 
and REAL ID driver’s licenses.446 The NGI Interstate Photo System, for instance, 
aims to aggregate digital photos from not only federal, state, and local law 
enforcement, but also digital photos from private businesses, social networking 
sites, government agencies, and foreign and international entities, as well as 
acquaintances, friends, and family members.447 
Table 17 lists some of the components of the NGI program, demonstrating how 
the FBI is attempting to implement a national coordinated biometric identification 
system through the interoperability of multiple digitalized biometric data 
identifiers. Media reports have identified the FBI’s interest in expanding NGI’s 
biometric databases as an underlying motivation for the rapid mandatory expansion 
of S-COMM through administrative actions by DHS.448  
Table 17. Examples of Components of FBI’s Next Generation Identification (NGI) 
NGI Subcomponent Description 
Repository for Individuals of 
Special Concern (RISC) 
Database of records of known or suspected 
terrorists, wanted persons, registered sex 
                                                                                                                 
 442. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18081 (Supp. 
2010)). 
 443. Id. at § 1411, 124 Stat. 224. 
 444. Tana Ganeva, 5 Things You Should Know About the FBI’s Massive New Biometric 
Database, ALTERNET (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.alternet.org/story/153664/5_things_you_
should_know_about_the_fbi’s_massive_new_biometric_database. 
 445. See Donohue, supra note 3, at 443–51. 
 446. See id. For more information about the FBI’s Next Generation Identification project, 
see Next Generation Identification, supra note 290; Beyond Fingerprints: Our New 
Identification System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.fbi.gov/
news/stories/2009/january/ngi_012609. 
 447. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) 
Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 300. The media stored by the system includes 
photographs searchable by using facial recognition technology, as well as photographs of 
scars, distinct marks, and tattoos. See Next Generation Identification, supra note 290. 
 448. Wilson, supra note 260; see also E-mail chain, FOIA document, FBI-SC-1250–53, 
at 1251–52 (Feb. 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/
07/Additional-NGI-Documents.zip. 
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offenders, and other persons of “heightened 
interest.”449 
Enhanced IAFIS Repository (EIR), 
includes the Rap Back Service 
Repository creates compatibility between 
existing civil and criminal repositories. 
Employers may enroll in the “Rap Back 
Service” which allows the FBI to collect 
employees’ biometric data and to notify 
employers regarding subsequent criminal, 
and certain civil, activities of employees.450 
Interstate Photo System (IPS) Incorporates media not just from law 
enforcement, but from private businesses, 
social networking sites, government 
agencies, and foreign and international 
entities, as well as individuals like 
acquaintances, friends, and family 
members.451 
Advanced Fingerprint Identification 
Technology (AFIT) 
Increases the processing capacity, storage 
capacity, and accuracy of IAFIS. Enables 
the rapid fingerprint search of the RISC.452  
National Palm Print System (NPPS) “[C]entralized repository for palm print data 
that can be accessed nationwide” by local, 
state, and federal law enforcement and 
criminal justice agencies.453 It will “enable 
users to search latent palmprints obtained 
from crime scenes against a national 
repository, enhancing law enforcement’s 
ability to solve crime.”454 
Disposition Reporting 
Improvements (DRI) 
Provides a more complete criminal history 
repository and more streamlined methods of 
transmitting disposition data via the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 449. Privacy Impact Assessment: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS)/Next Generation Identification (NGI) Repository for Individuals of Special Concern 
(RISC), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/
iafis-ngi-risc; see also Donohue, supra note 3, at 444–45. 
 450. See Next Generation Identification, supra note 290. According to one scholar, the 
Rap Back Service “essentially expands the biometric data collected by the FBI and creates a 
reporting-back mechanism that may take account of everything from attendance at political 
rallies, to parking violations, to formal charges related to serious crimes.” Donohue, supra 
note 3, at 446 (footnote omitted). 
 451. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) 
Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 300. The media stored by the system includes 
photographs searchable by using facial recognition technology, as well as photographs of 
scars, distinct marks, and tattoos. See Next Generation Identification, supra note 290. 
 452. See Next Generation Identification, supra note 290. 
 453. Id. 
 454. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION 2 (2009), 
available at http://www.biometriccoe.gov/_doc/FBI_CJIS_0209_NGI_OnePager020409.pdf. 
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Interstate Identification Index, the CJIS 
Wide Area Network, CD-ROM, and 
potentially through a direct connection to 
federal courts.455 
Iris Recognition Program Provides iris retrieval, search, and 
maintenance capabilities to identify 
“persons of interest.”456 
 
In summary, identity verification programs, such as E-Verify, and identity 
determination programs, such as S-COMM and NGI, are rapidly proliferating. 
They can be fairly characterized as components of a “cardless” national ID system 
in that they are helping to shape the drive for the development of a universal 
digitalized biometric database to support a biometric national ID system. 
Eventually, it is possible that such biometric databases will be used for identity 
inference programs that utilize the tools of big data cybersurveillance and mass 
dataveillance in attempts to predict crime and prevent terrorism, such as FAST, and 
to conduct national security risk assessments, such as the “No-Fly List” program. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent comprehensive immigration reform proposals have called for the 
enactment of a universal digitalized national ID system to “secure the border.” 
Either a biometric national ID card—e.g., a multimodal biometric Social Security 
Card, driver’s license, and/or passport—or a biometric E-Verify program would 
likely require a universal biometric database, requiring the collection and 
permanent or semipermanent electronic storage of, for example, the digital photos, 
fingerprints, iris scans, and/or DNA samples of those lawfully present in the United 
States. The constitutional, technological, social, and economic impact of a 
universal digitalized biometric ID system implemented on a national scale is 
difficult to overstate. Identity management systems—and the identity verification, 
identity determination, and identity inference programs that support such 
systems—have the potential to profoundly impact a wide range of substantive 
constitutional rights, privacy and civil rights, the constitutional scheme, and 
normative principles of governance in a democratic society. Yet, the potential 
constitutional and other consequences of a digitalized biometric national ID or 
other “cardless” digitalized identity registration system, and their cybersurveillance 
capacities, have not been fully researched.457 
                                                                                                                 
 
 455. Id. 
 456. Donohue, supra note 3, at 447 (explaining that very little information is known 
about this program, including how the information is maintained and shared, or at what 
distance the technology can capture an iris scan). 
 457. For example, Congress has only begun to consider the electronic privacy safeguards 
necessary for Internet database screening technologies through electronic privacy legislation, 
which would attempt to protect against discrimination and data misuse that could relate to a 
digitalized universal biometric database. See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, Ancient Electronic 
Communications Law May Finally Be Updated To Protect Email Privacy, SLATE (Mar. 19, 
2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/03/19/patrick_leahy_
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At this stage, a biometric national ID and universal biometric ID database 
system, utilized for widespread identity verification and identity management 
purposes, is nothing more than a legislative concept. Based on policy precedent 
involving the proliferation of database screening programs, however, it is unlikely 
that a biometric national ID would simply take the form of a digitalized Social 
Security Card that contains a chip with biometric information. A digitalized 
biometric national ID system would likely facilitate cybersurveillance and 
dataveillance through cybersurveillance-24/7 body tracking, dataveillance-360° 
biographical tracking, and restrict physical and logical access. 
Cybersurveillance-24/7 Body Tracking. A digitalized biometric national ID 
could be used to record our movement or create a virtual security checkpoint by 
recording our whereabouts at the time of the card swipe or smartphone read (e.g., 
requiring the biometric national ID to be produced at certain points of entry or exit, 
like the HSPD-12 PIV card). Or if a biometric national ID or ID smartphone is 
embedded with GPS-RFID tracking technology, such a system could facilitate 24/7 
tracking of anyone who possesses and carries such devices. 
Dataveillance-360° Biographical Tracking. Information linked to the data 
captured through the issuance and usage of such a digitalized biometric national ID 
system could be used to assess characteristics and patterns of those who possess 
and use such cards, smartphones, or other digitalized IDs. This could be done 
indiscriminately, such as through the mass cybersurveillance of ordinary citizens. 
Or this data could be used to target individuals or classifications of individuals—
such as targeting groups based on immigration status, national origin, credit 
history, or zipcode—for additional scrutiny or investigation. The government has 
implied that it can already engage in biographical data surveillance that is more 
invasive than the geolocational data surveillance that could be pulled from a GPS 
tracking device.458 In other words, sensitive behavioral and biographical data is 
already at the disposal of the government from credit card receipts, cell phone 
records, magazine subscriptions, income, zipcode, etc.459 Currently, interlocking 
databases can yield personally identifiable information or contextual information 
on an individual as an employee (e.g., E-Verify), recipient of benefits (e.g., SAVE), 
international traveler (US-VISIT), and consumer (e.g., ChoicePoint consumer 
database).460 
                                                                                                                 
introduces_legislation_to_update_ancient_electronic_communications.html; Press Release, 
Congresswoman Suzan DelBene, DelBene Co-Sponsors Bill with Rep. Lofgren To Reform 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://delbene.
house.gov/press-release/delbene-co-sponsors-bill-rep-lofgren-reform-electronic-communicat
ions-privacy-act. 
 458. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16:9–16, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 
(2012) (No. 10-1259), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/10-1259.pdf (Roberts, C.J.: “Well, you’re talking about the difference between 
seeing a little tile and seeing a mosaic. The one gives you information; the other doesn’t.” 
Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General: “So does a pen register. So does a garbage pull. So does 
looking at everybody’s credit card statement for a month. All of those things this Court has 
held are not searches.”). 
 459. See, e.g., Cate supra note 34, at 440–44, 457–60; Solove supra note 34, at 343–45, 
357. 
 460. Through current databases, the government can seek private informational 
databases, such as ChoicePoint, which collects data on consumer habits, credit reports, etc. 
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Restricting Physical and Logical Access. Protocols for ID production and 
inspection are currently implemented to restrict access to certain rights, benefits, 
and privileges. These identity verification programs are promulgated to satisfy 
requirements that identity, and citizenship or immigration status, has been 
established prior to granting the right to work, right to vote, right to access a 
driver’s license, etc. Such a digitalized biometric national ID system would likely 
be used to determine, for example, whether an individual is an unauthorized 
immigrant through E-Verify or HAVA, unauthorized for federal benefits through 
SAVE, and unauthorized for ground or air travel through REAL ID and the “No-
Fly List.” In addition, like the PIV card issued to federal government employees 
and federal contractors pursuant to HSPD-12, one day, a digital biometric card 
could be used to restrict both physical access (e.g., card read to enter buildings and 
offices) and to restrict logical access (e.g., card read to access computer and 
Internet). 
In other words, a digitalized biometric national ID, including a “cardless” ID 
system, could facilitate exponentially the convergence of 24/7 cybersurveillance-
body tracking and 360° dataveillance-biographical tracking through an automated 
and coordinated data infrastructure. The potential integration of GPS-RFID 
tracking into everyday ID documents, and the potential transformation of 
smartphones into ID devices, forces a consideration of the cybersurveillance and 
dataveillance implications of these emerging technologies. Those technologies will 
test the current Fourth Amendment doctrine because they enable the insertion of 
what is in effect a tracking device into identity cards and phones that citizens will 
carry voluntarily or by law in their pockets, wallets, and purses. Further, a 
digitalized ID that is machine readable and that must be produced for identity 
verification purposes will further dataveillance capacities through compulsory data 
collection (e.g., centralized, comprehensive biographical database on all citizens 
and noncitizens) and data accumulation and database aggregation (e.g., each card 
swipe or each time an ID or smartphone read is recorded digitally, such a read 
creates both a data record and an opportunity to integrate or aggregate existing data 
on an individual). The Fourth Amendment doctrine, therefore, must now evolve in 
the face of modern surveillance technologies and a new dawn of identity 









                                                                                                                 
Choicepoint, EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/. “The Justice Department (DOJ) has 
signed a $67 million contract with ChoicePoint to provide the FBI, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies with access to 
ChoicePoint’s 13 billion files.” ChoicePoint Sells Personal Data to U.S., PEOPLE’S WORLD 
(May 7, 2003), http://transitional.pww.org/choicepoint-sells-personal-data-to-u-s/. 
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF ACRONYMS AND KEY TERMS 
ABIS (Automated Biometrics Identification System) (DoD and DoS) 
 CBP (U.S. Customs and Border Protection/DHS) 
 CCTV (Closed Circuit Television Surveillance Video Cameras) 
 CODIS (Combined DNA Index System) (FBI/DOJ) 
 DHS (U.S. Department of Homeland Security) 
 Digitalized ID and Digitalized Biometric ID (Can refer to either ID card or 
 “cardless” identification system) 
 DMV (States’ Department [or Division] of Motor Vehicles) 
 DOC (U.S. Department of Commerce) 
 DoD (U.S. Department of Defense) 
 DOJ (U.S. Department of Justice) 
DoS (U.S. Department of State) 
Drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) 
E-Verify (Identity verification through Internet-driven database screening) 
(DHS and SSA) 
FAST (Future Attribute Screening Technology) (DHS) 
FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation/DOJ) 
GPS (Global Positioning System) 
HAVA (Help America Vote Act of 2002, setting forth SSN database screening 
protocols in an attempt to ensure integrity of voter registration) 
HSPD (Homeland Security Presidential Directive) 
HSPD-12 (Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees 
and Contractors) 
ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/DHS) 
IDENT (Automated Biometric Identification System) (DHS) 
IAFIS (Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System) (FBI/DOJ) 
NCIC (National Crime Information Center) (FBI/DOJ) 
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology/DOC) 
NGI (Next Generation Identification) (FBI/DOJ) 
NUMIDENT (Numerical Identification) (SSA’s SSN database) 
OPM (Office of Personnel Management/White House) 
PIV Card (Personal Identity Verification Card) (Mandated by HSPD-12 for 
federal employees and federal government contractors)  
RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) 
SAVE (Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements) (USCIS/DHS) 
S-COMM (Secure Communities) (ICE/DHS) 
SEVIS (Student and Exchange Visitor Information System) (DHS) 
SSA (Social Security Administration) 
SSN (Social Security Number) 
TSA (Transportation Security Administration/DHS) 
USCIS (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services/DHS) 
US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) 
(National Protection and Program Directorate/DHS) 
